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AVAILABLE TO VICTIMS AND A PROPOSAL
FOR CHANGE IN CRIMINAL LEGISLATION
A woman suffering from low self-esteem, compulsive disorders,
premenstrual syndrome and suicidal tendencies consults a therapist.
The woman has difficulty discussing sexual issues, but the therapist
pressures her, telling her that he wants to "work" with her on her
sexuality and that sex is a gift from God. The therapist then suggests
that the woman's problems may be attributable to her husband and
discourages her from confiding in friends.
After several months of counseling, the therapist and patient
begin to hug and kiss during the therapy sessions. The woman
questions the therapist as to whether this physical contact is "normal
counseling." The therapist simply replies that he loves her. When
the woman requests a platonic relationship, the therapist presents
her with a rose and assures her that their relationship will remain
pure and chaste. Yet within months, the two have engaged in sexual
intercourse at a local motel. In one of the thirty-two cards and
letters the woman wrote to the therapist, she stated, "I, the under-
signed, have given [the therapist] control of my life—my future out
of my abiding love for him."'
National surveys reveal that up to 12.1% of male psychother-
apists may be sexually intimate with their patients. 2 Commentators
speculate that sexual relations between therapists and patients may
be more prevalent than studies reveal, due to a reluctance by ther-
apists to admit to such behavior. 3 The American Psychological As-
1 The facts of this scenario were derived from the case of State v. Dutton, 450 N.W.2d
189, 191-92 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
2 KENNETH S. POPE & JACQUELINE BOLIHOOTSOS, SEXUAL INTIMACY BETWEEN THERAPISTS
AND PATIENTS at v (1986).
See SOHAN LAL SHARMA, THE THERAPEUTIC DIALOGUE 235 (1986). Most therapists
recognize such behavior as unethical and may fear legal action. See id. In addition, the
number of complaints filed with ethics committees, licensing boards and the courts probably
do not accurately represent the prevalence of therapist-patient sexual contact. Kenneth S.
Pope, Research and Laws Regarding Therapist-Patient Sexual Involvement: Implications for Thera-
pists, 40 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 564, 566 (1986). Complaints are rarely filed for a number of
reasons. The patient's feelings of powerlessness, guilt or mistrust may prevent her from filing
a complaint. Jacqueline Bouhoutsos, Therapist-Client Sexual Involvement: A Challenge for Mental
Health Professionals and Educators, 55 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 177, 179 (1985) . Patients may
also fear publicity. Id. Moreover, some patients do not file complaints because they have not
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sociation and the American Psychiatric Association have stated that
any sexual contact between psychotherapists and their patients is
unethical and harmful to patients. 4 Patients who have engaged in
sexual relationships with their therapists experience severe emo-
tional trauma, sometimes resulting in hospitalization or attempted
suicide. 5
Both the psychotherapeutic and legal communities have en-
gaged in research and discussion on the most effective way to com-
bat this problem. 6 Psychotherapeutic professionals have recom-
mended better training for therapists and consumer education for
patients.? Courts and legislatures have created civil causes of action
for plaintiffs. 8 Many courts have held that psychotherapists who
engage in sexual conduct with their patients are liable for malprac-
tice based upon mishandling of the therapeutic phenomenon
known as "transference."9 Juries have awarded sexually exploited
patients millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages."'
In addition, most courts require the therapist's malpractice insur-
ance company to defend the therapist in the civil suit or pay the
patient's damage award, depending upon the terms of the mal-
practice policy."
More recently, several states have passed strict statutes crimin-
alizing this behavior.' 2 Prior to the enactment of these statutes,
completely resolved their feelings of transference and do not want to cause the therapist any
pain. Id.
4 See Jean Corey Holroyd & Annette M. Brodsky, Psychologists' Attitudes and Practices
Regarding Erotic and Nonerotic Physical Contact with Patients, 32 AM. Psvctica.octsT 843, 893
(1977).
5 Bouhoutsos, supra note 3, at 178; Jacqueline Bouhoutsos et al., Sexual Intimacy Between
Psychotherapists and Patients, 14 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAc. 185, 190-91 (1983).
6 See, e.g., Bouhoutsos, supra note 3, at 177; Kenneth S. Pope, Preventing Therapist-Patient
Sexual Intimacy: Threrapy for a Therapist at Ride, 18 PROF. PSYCH.: RES. & PRAC. 624, 627 (1987).
7 See Pope, supra note 6, at 625; POPE & BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 2, at 151-55.
° See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148A.02 (West 1989) (creating a civil cause of action for
sexual exploitation by a psychotherapist); Roy v. Hartogs, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1976) (allowing a malpractice action against a sexually exploitative psychiatrist).
9 See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Minn. 1990)
(sexual activity resulting from the mishandling of the transference phenomenon is malprac-
tice); Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 761 (Mo. 1968) (same); L.L. v. Medical Protective
Co., 362 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (same).
'° Pope, supra note 3, at 565.
" See, e.g., Love, 459 N.W.2d at 702; Zipkin, 436 S.W.2d at 761; Medical Protective, 362
N.W.2d at 463.
19 See CAL. CRIM. CODE § 729 (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. I} 18-3-405.5 (1986); 1990
FLA. LAWS ch. 70; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17—A, 11 253 (West Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 609.349, 609.395 (West Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-06.1 (Supp. 1989);
WIS. STAT. ANN. 1 940.22 (West Supp. 1990).
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therapists who engaged in sexual contact with their patients could
only be prosecuted for rape or sexual assault." These statutes,
however, criminalize a broad range of sexual contact." Further-
more, because the statutes eliminate consent as a defense for the
therapist, states can prosecute these therapists more easily."
This note examines the problem of sexual misconduct by psy-
chotherapists and discusses both civil and criminal remedies avail-
able to victims. Section I defines the problem and explores how
sexual relationships between therapists and patients arise and why
they are harmful to the patients." Section II traces the development
of the different administrative and civil causes of action available
to victims of sexual misconduct.° This section also discusses how
insurance companies have responded to lawsuits from patients."
Section II also examines the recently enacted criminal statutes that
criminalize sexual contact between therapists and patients.' 9
 This
section discusses the range of behavior that the statutes cover and
the controversy surrounding the elimination of consent as a de-
fense. 2° Finally, Section III examines the sufficiency of various legal
remedies to combat sexual misconduct and concludes that although
the criminal legislation enacted by most states provides some ben-
efits to victims of sexual misconduct, the criminal statutes are gen-
erally too broad and legislatures could better serve psychotherapeu-
tic professionals, their victims and the general public by revising
the statutes to fulfill additional goals. 21
I. THERAPIST-PATIENT SEX: CAUSES AND EFFECTS
In recent years, both the general public and the psychothera-
peutic professional community have become increasingly concerned
with the growing problem of therapist-patient sexual exploitation. 22
16 See, e.g., Bernstein v. Board of Medical Examiners, 22 Cal, Rptr. 419, 420 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1962) (prosecution for statutory rape); Eberhart v. State, 34 N.E. 637, 637 (Ind. 1893)
(prosecution for rape); State v. Ely, 194 P. 988, 988 (Wash. 1921) (prosecution for rape).
14 See, e.g., CAL. Bus, & PROF. CODE 4 729 (West 1990) (prohibited sexual contact includes
touching of any intimate part); Wis. STAT. ANN. 44 940.22 (5), 940.225 (5)(b) (West Supp.
1990) (prohibited sexual contact includes any intentional touching).
" See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 4 729 (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. 4 18-3-405.5
(1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. 4 940.22 (West Supp. 1990).
16 See infra notes 22-79 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 80-185 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 186-252 and accompanying text.
' 9 See infra notes 253-300 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 262-74 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 301-27 and accompanying text.
22 See Pope, supra note 3, at 564; Bouhoutsos et al., supra note 5, at 185.
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In one survey, 7.1% of male psychiatrists and 3.1% of female psy-
chiatrists acknowledged having sexual contact with their patients."
A survey of psychologists found that 9.4% of male therapists and
2.5% of female therapists engaged in sexual intimacies with pa-
tients. 24
 The overwhelming majority of these sexual relationships
occur between male therapists and their female patients.25 Almost
all therapists agree that such sexual contact is unethical and usually
harmful to the patient. 26
In examining this problem, one must consider the context in
which the sexual activity arises. The frailty of both the therapist
and the patient, combined with the dynamics of the therapeutic
relationship itself, provide a foundation for the problem. 27 Individ-
uals seek therapy for a wide variety of reasons, ranging from minor
neurotic conflicts to major cognitive, affective or organic disorders. 28
Some patients have a history of psychiatric illness or substance
25 Nanette Gartrell, Psychiatrist-Patient Sexual Contact: Results of a National Survey, I:
Prevalence, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1126, 1126 (1986). Different surveys may present varying
statistics. See, e.g., POPE & BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 2, at v.
24 Kenneth S. Pope et al., Sexual Attraction to Clients, 41 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 147, 152
(1986). Again, different surveys may present varying statistics. See, e.g., Holroyd & Brodsky,
supra note 4, at 843 (5.5% of male psychologists and 0.6% of female psychologists reported
engaging in sexual intercourse with patients). According to this survey, an additional 2.6%
of male therapists engaged in sexual intercourse with their patients within three months
subsequent to the termination of therapy. Id.
22 SHARMA, supra note 3, at 237-38; see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Love, 459
N.W.2d 698, 700 n.1 (Minn. 1990). For this reason, this note will refer to the therapists as
males and the patients as females. In rare instances, a sexual relationship may occur between
a female therapist and a male patient. See, e.g., Johnson v. Arkansas Bd. of Examiners in
Psychology, 808 S.W.2d 766, 767-68 (Ark. 1991) (female psychologist appealed board deci-
sion to suspend license because of sexual relationship with male patient); Weaver v. Union
Carbide Corp., 378 S.E.2d 105, 106 (W. Va. 1989) (wife sued female counselor for engaging
in intimate relations with husband-patient). Sexual contact has also occurred between ther-
apists and patients of the same sex. See, e.g., State v. Leiding, 812 P.2d 797, 801 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1991) (Bivens, J., specially concurring).
26 See Judith Lewis Herman et al., Psychiatrist-Patient Sexual Contact: Results of a National
Survey, II: Psychiatrists' Attitudes, 144 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 164, 165 (1987) (98% of psychiatrists
believe sexual contact is always inappropriate and usually harmful to the patient); see also
Debra S. Borys & Kenneth S. Pope, Dual Relationships Between Therapist and Client: A National
Study of Psychologists, Psychiatrists, and Social Workers, 20 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 283,
289 (1989) (98.3% of psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers believe sexual contact
with patients is never ethical); Holroyd & Brodsky, supra note 4, at 845 (only 4% of psy-
chologists thought erotic contact might ever be beneficial to the opposite sex patient).
27 See Roberta J. Apfel & Bennett Simon, Patient-Therapist Sexual Contact, 43 PSYCHO-
THERAPY & PSYCHOSOMATICS 57, 57 (1985). Commentators have suggested that these factors
and others make elimination of the problem unlikely. Id. For a general discussion of vulner-
abilities of patients and potential "risk groups," see POPE & BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 2, at
46-56.
28 Pope, supra note 3, at 567.
May 1992]	 THERAPIST SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 	 649
abuse.29 Others have experienced childhood incest or sexual
abuse. 3°
Patients who have histories of sexual abuse are particularly
vulnerable to sexual exploitation by their therapists." Such sexual
abuse often results in serious difficulties with interpersonal rela-
tionships, for which the patients seek help. 32 A patient who has been
a victim of childhood sexual abuse may experience the same fears
in therapy that she experienced as a child—that she cannot survive
without the parent's or therapist's love and protection." Because of
the dynamics of the original abusive relationship, the patient is
particularly vulnerable to exploitation. 34 She will assume the blame
for the sexual activity and will reenact the patterns of secrecy
learned in childhood." Thus, as the patient attempts to resolve her
own emotional childhood trauma, she is particularly vulnerable to
exploitation.
The therapeutic relationship itself also contributes to the pa-
tient's vulnerability. 36 The patient who enters therapy places much
trust in the therapist and reveals her thoughts and fantasies in hopes
of attaining relief from her discomforts' Because of this trust, she
may believe that the therapist will only act to help her, and therefore
she may become confused by the therapist's sexual advances and
let down her customary defenses."
30 See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. D.H.L., 459 N.W.2d 704, 705 (Minn. 1990)
(patient had drug abuse problem); Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry, 329 N.W.2d
306, 308 (Minn, 1982) (patient severely depressed and chemically dependent); Olson v.
Connerly, 457 N.W.2d 479, 480 n.1 (Wis.. 1990) (patient treated for alcohol and drug
dependency for years); see also Bouhoutsos, supra note 3, at 178 .
5° See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Cu. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 699 (Minn. 1990)
(patient sexually abused as child); D.H.L., 459 N.W.2d at 705 (patient sexually abused as
child); Olson, 457 N.W.2d at 480 n.1 (patient sexually abused and raped as a child); see also
POPE & BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 2, at 53-54.
3i See POPE & BOIMOUTSOS, supra note 2, at 53-54.
" See id. at 54 (patients with a history of abuse frequently are diagnosed as having
histrionic or borderline personality disorder). See generally Thomas J. Gutheil, Borderline
Personality Disorder, Boundary Violations, and Patient-Therapist Sex: Medicolegal Pitfalls, 146 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 567 (1989) (discussing borderline personality disorder and its relation to
therapist-patient sex).
33 POPE & BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 2, at 53.
" See id.
53 See id,
" See id. at 46.
37 Id.
33 See, e.g., id, (therapist promises confidentiality, concern and help in return for patient's
trust); see also Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry, 329 N.W.2d 306, 308 (Minn. 1982)
(patient testified that she became "quite upset and confused" because of the trust she placed
in her psychologist).
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Furthermore, there is an unequal distribution of power in the
therapeutic relationship, which favors the therapist by increasing
the patient's vulnerability. 39 The patient's desperate need to end
her discomfort and her belief in her therapist's knowledge may
"purvey this power differential and color the therapeutic inter-
change."" Some patients submit to the therapist's sexual advances
because of their perception of the therapist's status and authority.'"
Furthermore, some patients acquiesce to their therapist's sexual
advances out of a fear that the therapist might abandon them by
terminating therapy. 4 2 The unequal distribution of power in the
therapeutic relationship is yet another factor that creates a partic-
ular vulnerability in the patient and underlies the problem of sexual
misconduct as a whole.
Most sexual relationships between therapists and patients arise
from the "transference phenomenon."'" Transference is the emo-
tional reaction that the patient experiences toward the therapist
during therapy." The patient may develop an extreme emotional
dependence on the therapist, projecting onto the therapist feelings
of love or need that remain unresolved from prior relationships."
Some patients develop erotic feelings or fantasies toward the ther-
apist." In some instances, the patient may become seductive toward
the therapist in an attempt to resolve these feelings. 47 Other patients
report warm and trustful feelings, which some therapists may in-
terpret as sexual in nature." Sigmund Freud likened transference
50 See POPE Sc BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 2, at 46.
40 Id.
41
 Bouhoutsos, supra note 3, at 178. ,
42 See Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Center, 791 P.2d 344, 345 (Alaska 1990); Morris v.
Board of Registration in Medicine, 539 N.E.2d 50, 51 (Mass.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 977
(1989); see also Bouhoutsos, supra note 3, at 178.
4' Pope et al., supra note 24, at 148-50. In at least one case, however, a court has stated
that sexual relationships between therapists and patients may not always grow out of the
transference phenomenon. See St. Paul Fire Sc Marine Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 702
(Minn. 1990). Because the therapist often plays an active role in instigating the sexual contact,
his personal needs and motivations may be a large contributor. See SHARMA, SUPTO note 3, at
235.
44 See SHARMA, supra note 3, at 179-218. Transference is considered a basic part of
psychoanalysis and was discussed extensively by Freud. See id. at 180-82; see also L.L. v.
Medical Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d 174, 177 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
45 See Medical Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d at 177. These feelings may have been originally
directed toward the client's parents or significant others. SHARMA, supra note 3, at 179.
40 SHARMA, supra note 3, at 200.
47 Id. at 238. In one case, the patient began asking personal questions of the therapist
and became flirtatious, stating, "'l felt that he liked me, so I felt that I had to be sexual."'
Love, 459 N.W.2d at 699.
49 See SHARMA, supra note 3, at 201-02.
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to "falling in love," which is induced by the therapeutic situation
rather than by the personality or character of the individual ther-
apist.49
In healthy therapeutic relationships, the therapist uses trans-
ference to aid the patient in resolving her feelings arising from past
unsettled relationships." The therapist explains to the patient that
a patient commonly develops feelings toward the therapist during
psychotherapy and encourages the patient to discuss these feelings,
helping her to relate them to interpersonal relationships in her own
life." During the normal course of therapy, the therapist should
maintain a neutral emotional position while still demonstrating in-
terest and concern. 52 In many therapeutic relationships, however,
therapists will react to the patient's growing love and dependence
by developing feelings for the patient. 53 This "counter-transference"
is a reaction to the patient's transference, rather than true feelings
for the patient as an individua1.54 Some of these feelings, such as
empathy, warmth and compassion, are necessary to a successful
therapeutic relationship. 55 Other feelings of the therapist, romantic
or erotic in nature, can become damaging to the therapeutic rela-
tionship, if not handled properly. 56 The less counter-transference
the therapist develops, the more effective the therapist will be in
aiding the patient in resolving her feelings of transference because
the therapist's own emotions will not intrude upon his assessment
of the patient. 57
49 POPE & BOUHOUTS05, supra note 2, at 29; Pope et al., supra note 24, at 149 (citing
FREUD, Further Recommendations in the Technique of Psychoanalysis: Observations on Transference-
Love, in FREUD: THERAPY AND TECHNIQUE 167,169 (P. Rieff ed. 1915).
56 See SHARMA, supra note 3, at 208-11.
." Id. at 214. For example, the therapist might say, "'Being aware of your feelings will
help you work out some of the important and conflicting emotions in your interpersonal
relationships. Recognizing the feelings that you have toward me is a step in your ability to
feel and to relate to other people,'" Id.
52 Id. at 211.
53 Id. at 223.
54 Pope et al., supra note 24, at 149.
" SHARMA, supra note 3, at 223.
56 Id. at 233-34. Professionals have differing views regarding the counter-transference
phenomenon. Pope et al., supra note 24, at 149. Some authorities view the therapist's attrac-
tion to the client as "a therapeutic error, something to hide and be ashamed of." Id. Others
feel that when counter-transference is correctly managed it can be a "valuable therapeutic
resource." Id. In either case, counter-transference is a widespread phenomenon based on the
high percentage of therapists who have reported feeling attracted to their patients at some
point during practice. See id. at 155.
57 SHARMA, supra note 3, at 211.
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Thus, if the therapist is professional in his handling of the
transference phenomenon, he is less apt to act sexually upon his
feelings of counter-transference. 58 Instead, he will recognize and
resolve these feelings, either by himself or with another profes-
sional.59 The therapist mishandles the transference phenomenon,
however, when he acts upon his personal needs and motivations,
and enters into a sexual relationship with the patient. 6°
Almost all patients who have been victims of sexual misconduct
by their psychotherapists sustain some type of damage. 6 ' Patients
have reported severe emotional harm such as humiliation, mental
anguish, shock, shame, depression and general deterioration of
emotional well-being. 62 Many sexually exploited patients suffer
from post-traumatic stress disorder. 63 Patients often suffer marital
difficulties or break-ups.° Due to the emotional trauma, many pa-
tients require subsequent medical treatment, including both therapy
and hospitalization." In one case, a victim was forced to seek hos-
55 See L.L. v. Medical Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
55 SHARMA, supra note 3, at 252-53. The most widely accepted method of resolving
counter-transference is through the course of supervision with a superior or a peer group.
Id. at 253. In addition, some professionals recommend discussing counter-transference with
the patient as it occurs. Id. at 253-54.
60
 See Medical Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d at 178.
ei Bouhoutsos, supra note 3, at 178; Bouhoutsos et al., supra note 5, at 191.
62 See Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Mo. 1968) (patient suffered remorse,
humiliation, anguish, nervousness and insomnia); Corgan v. Muehling, 522 N.E.2d 153, 154
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (patient experienced fear, shame, humiliation and guilt), aff'd, 574 N.E.2d
602 (111. 1991); Omer v. Edgren, 685 P.2d 635, 636 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). Some. researchers
have termed these emotional symptoms "Therapist-Patient Sex Syndrome." See POPE &
BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 2, at 64. The symptoms include ambivalence, guilt, feelings of
isolation, feelings of emptiness, cognitive dysfunction, identity and boundary disturbance,
inability to trust, sexual confusion, moodiness, suppressed rage and increased suicidal risk.
Id. These symptoms are the same or similar to those experienced by victims of incest and
child abuse. Id.
63 POPE & BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 2, at 65. Researchers have noted: "Many who are
seriously traumatized have literally spent lifetimes undoing the damage [sexual involvement
with their therapists] has caused." Id. The trauma causes them to be obsessed with the sexual
involvement, and they are isolated and unable to seek support or help. Id. at 65-66. Fur-
thermore, if they do talk about it, they may be blamed for the involvement by others and
revictimized. Id. at 66; see also Olson v. Connerly, 457 N.W.2d 479, 480 (Wis. 1990) (conflicting
testimony as to whether patient sustained Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder).
64 See, e.g., Anclote Manor Found. v. Wilkinson, 263 So. 2d 256, 257 (Fla. 1972); Zipkin,
436 S.W.2d at 758; Omer, 685 P.2d at 636; see also Bouhoutsos et al., supra note 5, at 190
(26% of patients' sexual, marital or intimate relationships worsened); Apfel & Simon, supra
note 27, at 60 (already troubled marriages become worse as a result of sexual involvement).
85 See, e.g., Corgan v. Muehling, 522 N.E.2d 153, 154 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (patient
required extensive psychotherapeutic care and counseling), aff'd, 574 N.E.2d 602 (III. 1991);
Roy v, Hartogs, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (patient sought hospitalization
May 1992]	 THERAPIST SEXUAL MISCONDUCT	 653
pitalization on two separate occasions following a thirteen-month
sexual relationship with her psychiatrist. 66 A small percentage of
sexually abused patients have even attempted suicide as a result of
this abuse. 67 Some patients also experience physical trauma arising
out of the emotional turmoil, such as severe abdominal pain or
headaches.68
Furthermore, the harm patients suffer may be exacerbated by
a reluctance to seek any further therapy due to an inability to trust
another therapist.69 Some patients may not seek therapy at all or
delay the process for many years." If the patient does attempt to
seek therapy, the patient may still reveal an ambivalence towards
therapy represented by an inability to choose a new therapist or by
frequent changes of therapists." Also, the patient may mistrust the
new therapist's judgment and she may fear her story will not be
believed.72 Finally, if able to commit to a new therapeutic relation-
ship, the patient may be so guarded that she asks for a promise of
"no sex" from the new therapist." Underlying much of the difficulty
in re-entering therapy is the patient's continuing emotional com-
mitment or allegiance to the former therapist. 74
In sum, patients who enter therapy are vulnerable. 75 They place
their trust and emotional well-being under the care of a profes-
twice); see also Bouhoutsos et al., supra note 5, at 190 (11% of patients were hospitalized as a
result of sexual involvement with a therapist).
" Harlogs, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
67 See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986) (patient
attempted suicide); Anclote Manor Found., 263 So. 2d at 257 (patient committed suicide after
involvement with therapist and other traumatic events); Pundy v. Department of Professional
Regulation, 570 N.E.2d 458, 461 (III. App. Ct. 1991) (patient testified that she attempted
suicide); see also Bouhoutsos et al., supra note 5, at 190 (one percent of patients committed
suicide because of sexual involvement with therapist).
Zipkin, 436 S.W.2d at 755-56 (patient was unable to sleep and had headaches); Olson
v. Connerly, 445 N.W.2d 706, 712 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (patient described extreme abdominal
pain connected with recollection of therapist's actions, and "panic attacks" causing inability
to breathe, gagging and sweating), aff'd, 457 N.W.2d 479, 484 (Wis. 1990).
66 See Zipkin, 436 S.W.2d at 759. In one survey, almost half of the patients interviewed
found it more difficult to recommence therapy with another therapist. See Bouhoutsos et al.,
supra note 5, at 190-91. The more intense the sexual involvement, the greater likelihood
that patients have difficulty returning to therapy. Id. at 191; see also Apfel & Simon, supra
note 27, at 58.
7° Apfel & Simon, supra note 27, at 58; Bouhoutsos et al., supra note 5, at 191.
71
 Apfel & Simon, supra note 27, at 58; Bouhoutsos et al., supra note 5, at 191.
Apfel & Simon, supra note 27, at 58; Bouhoutsos et al., supra note 5, at 191.
73 Bouhoutsos et al., supra note 5, at 191.
" Apfel & Simon, supra note 27, at 58; Bouhoutsos et al., supra note 5, at 191.
" See L.L. v. Medical Protective Co„ 362 N.W.2d 174, 177 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (patient
developed extreme emotional dependence on therapist). See generally POPE & BOUHOUTSOS,
supra note 2, at 46-47.
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sional. 76
 The patient may begin to experience transference and
develop an emotional dependence on the therapist." The proper
handling of the patient's transference can lead to a resolution of
emotional conflicts and relief of the patient's distress." If, however,
the therapist mishandles the transference and enters into a sexual
relationship with the patient, the patient's trust is violated, the care
is jeopardized and the patient is likely to suffer severe emotional or
physical trauma."
II. LEGAL RESPONSES TO SEXUAL MISCONDUCT BY
PSYCHOTHERAPISTS
A. Administrative Remedies
Victims of sexual misconduct can seek redress through several
different administrative mechanisms." Depending on what victims
seek as compensation, they may choose to act through either a
professional association or licensing board. 8 ' Commentators recog-
nize these methods as having varying degrees of efficiency and
effectiveness. 82
Professional associations are voluntary organizations of profes-
sional practitioners that exist at local, state or national levels. 88 Na-
tionally, such professional organizations include the American Psy-
chiatric Association, the American Psychological Association and the
National Association of Social Workers. 84 In order to file an ethics
complaint with a professional organization, the complainant typi-
cally must complete a form for an investigatory subcommittee, de-
scribing the particular ethical principles violated by the therapist. 85
" See Medical Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d at 177; see alto POPE & Boutioursos, supra note
2, at 46.
77 See Medical Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d at 177.
78 See SHARMA, supra note 3, at 208.
78 See Medical Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d at 177-78; Bouhoutsos et al., supra note 5, at
191.
°° See Leonard L. Riskin, Sexual Relations Between Psychotherapists and their Patients: Toward
Research or Restraint, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1000, 1006-08 (1979); Stone, The Legal Implications of
Sexual Activity Between Psychiatrist and Patient, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1138, 1138 (1976).
81 See POPE & BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 2, at 155-59.
" See id. at 157-59.
83
 See id. at 155-56.
" See id. at 30-31.
85 Id. at 156. The major mental health professional organizations, including the Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, the National Association
of Social Workers, the American Psychoanalytic Association and the American Association
for Marriage and Family Therapy have revised their ethics codes to explicitly prohibit
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After a subcommittee has reviewed evidence from both sides, it
makes a recommendation to an entire ethics committee." The ethics
committee and ultimately the board of directors vote on the dis-
position of the case." Possible penalties include expulsion from the
organization, probation, surveillance or a required apology."
Commentators have stated that professional associations may
not be the most effective method of resolving the problem of ther-
apist sexual misconduct. 89 These associations, beyond threatening
expulsion, have little authority to act regarding the problem of
sexual exploitation by therapists. 9° Furthermore, these organiza-
tions have no control over practitioners who are not members and
who are therefore not bound by the association's code of ethics. 9 '
In addition, few victims choose to file complaints through profes-
sional associations, perhaps because of the complexity of the com-
plaint filing system. 92 Other patients may feel that an implicit bias
exists in the process, because the ethics committees are composed
of other psychotherapeutic professionals."
Patients may also choose to file a complaint through the local
licensing board. 94 These boards, granted authority by state govern-
ments to oversee licensed professionals and thereby to protect con-
sumers, may revoke the professional's license to practice. 95 Psychi-
atrists are generally under the jurisdiction of a medical board,
therapist-patient sexual contact. Id. at 30-31. For example, the code of the American Psy-
chiatric Society states, "The necessary intensity of the therapeutic relationship may tend to
activate sexual and other needs and fantasies on the part of both patient and therapist, while
weakening' the objectivity necessary for control. Sexual activity with a patient is unethical."
Id. at 31.
86 Id. at 156.
87 Id.
88 See, e.g., MASSACHUSETTS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES FOR THE OPERA-
TION OF 'rHE STATE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION ETHICS COMMITTEE, Section VII (6); see also
POPE & BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 2, at 156.
'9 See Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2, at 157.
9° See id. at 155; Stone, supra note 80, at 1140.
91 POPE & BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 2, at 155-56.
92 Id. at 157.
95 Id.
9' Id. at 158; Stone, supra note 80, at 1140-41; see, e.g., Solloway v. Department of
Professional Regulation, 421 So. 2d 573, 573-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (psychiatrist
appealed revocation of license by Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical
Examiners for sexual exploitation), rev. denied, 430 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1983); Morris v. Board
of Registration in Medicine, 539 N.E.2d 50,50 (Mass.) (psychiatrist appealed revocation of
license by Board of Registration in Medicine for sexual misconduct), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
977 (1989).
93 See POPE & BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 2, at 158.
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whereas psychologists and other counselors are under the jurisdic-
tion of either a medical or other professional licensing board. 96
In a typical complaint procedure, the complainant must first
complete a form identifying all of the descriptive information, such
as relevant dates and the name of the perpetrator. 97 The licensing
board staff determines whether to forward the complaint to the
board's investigatory unit or the attorney general's office. 98 The
board then receives a preliminary investigative report and decides
whether to close the case or file a formal complaint. 99 Eventually, if
the case cannot be settled, an administrative law judge will hear the
case.'w After the administrative law judge renders his or her deci-
sion, the board must either accept or reject that decision.'°' If the
therapist is found guilty, the board may then take some disciplinary
action, possibly the revocation or suspension of the practitioner's
license.'" The decisions of licensing boards are final and often
withstand challenges in court.'"
A patient who has been sexually exploited by her therapist can
opt for administrative remedies. ' 94
 Commentators, however, note
that these alternatives have many disadvantages and inadequa-
96 Id.
In Id. at 161.
98 Id.
" Id.
I" Id. at 162.
101 Id.
102 Id. See, e.g., Board of Registration of Psychologists, 251 Mass. Regs. Code 3.14
(1989) (Board may suspend or revoke license); Board of Registration in Medicine, 243 Mass.
Regs. Code § 1.05 (1988) (Board may revoke, suspend, or cancel certificate of registration;
reprimand, censure, or impose a fine; or require the performance of public service).
10S See, e.g., Johnson v. Arkansas Bd. of Examiners in Psychology, 808 S.W.2d 766, 767
(Ark. 1991) (court upheld Board's decision to suspend psychologist's license); Dresser v.
Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 181 Cal. Rptr. 797, 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (court
held that Board did not abuse discretion in revoking psychologist's license); Solloway v.
Department of Professional Regulation, 421 So. 2d 573, 575 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (court
upheld Board decision to revoke license of psychiatrist), petition for rev. denied, 430 So. 2d
452 (Fla. 1983); Pundy v. Department of Professional Regulation, 570 N.E.2d 458, 467 (III.
App. Ct. 1991) (court upheld Department's decision to suspend psychiatrist's license and did
not abuse its discretion); Cares v. New Mexico Bd. of Psychologist Examiners, 798 P.2d 190,
191-92 (N.M. 1990) (court upheld Board's decision to revoke psychologist's license based on
plentiful substantial evidence in record); Davis v. Psychology Examining Bd., 431 N.W.2d
730, 731 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (court held that substantial evidence supported Board's decision
not to reissue psychologist's license). Illy see Morris v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 539
N.E.2d 50, 55-56 (Mass. 1989) (Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence
and court remanded for further proceedings), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 977 (1989).
104 See Stone, supra note 80, at 1138.
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cies.'°5 For example, the procedure of license revocation, including
the administrative hearing, is time-consuming and stressful for the
patient.'°5 Moreover, in many states, therapists who have had their
licenses revoked may still be able to practice unlicensed under a
different title. 1 °7 Therefore, given the drawbacks of these admin-
istrative options, many patients seek to redress the sexual miscon-
duct by bringing a civil lawsuit. 1 °5
B. Civil Lawsuits
Victims of sexual misconduct by psychotherapists may seek
redress by bringing a civil suit, typically under a theory of malprac-
tice or negligent infliction of emotional distress.'° 9 Patients may seek
compensatory damages for the emotional harm that they have suf-
fered, as well as punitive damages for the therapist's unprofessional
conduct."° These damages may aid the patient in paying for future
therapy or hospitalization."' Civil litigation in this area has in-
creased dramatically in recent years." 2
105 See POPE & Bouttoursos, supra note 2, at 157-59; see also Riskin, supra note 80, at
1006.
'°6 See POPE & BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 2, at 162.
107 Id. at 159. For example, an unlicensed therapist may continue to practice under the
title "counselor," "therapist," or "analyst." Id. One therapist merely told her patients that she
had to change her title because she had run into bureaucratic red tape. See id. at 160. In
addition, a therapist whose license has been revoked may apply for reinstatement after a
certain amount of time. See, e.g., Board of Registration of Psychologists, 251 Mass. Regs Code
§ 3.14 (1989) (person whose license has been revoked may apply for reinstatement three
years after the date of revocation); Board of Registration in Medicine, 243 Mass. Regs. Code
§ 1.05 (1988) (person previously registered by the Board may apply for reinstatement no
sooner than five years after revocation, unless Board orders otherwise).
'w See, e.g., Roy v. Hartogs, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Olson v.
Connerly, 445 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 457 N.W.2d 479, 484 (Wis.
1990).
I" See, e.g., Hartogs, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 588 (malpractice); Olson, 445 N.W.2d at 712
(malpractice and negligent infliction of emotional distress). In a few states, legislatures have
also created statutory causes of action for sexual misconduct by psychotherapists. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148A.02 (West 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. 895.70(2) (West, Supp. 1991);
CAL. Civ. CODE 43.93(b) (West Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 802 (Smith-Hurd
1989). This note, however, traces the evolution of the common law. For a fuller discussion
of statutory causes of action, see Linda Jorgenson et al., The Furor Over Psychotherapist-Patient
Sexual Contact: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645, 702-08 (1991).
110 See, e.g., Hartogs, 381 N.Y.S.2d, at 589 (court allowed compensatory damages, but
found that the evidence did not justify punitive damages).
" I See POPE & BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 2, at 133.
" 2 See Daniel Coleman, New Guidelines Issued on Patient-Therapist Sex, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
20, 1990, at B21.
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The legal theories on which courts have granted relief to vic-
timized patients have evolved over the years. Historically, courts
allowed a cause of action for "seduction," which involved the per-
suasion of a woman of chaste character to depart from her "path
of virtue."" 3 Although the parents or guardian of the seduced
female usually brought this right of action, some jurisdictions al-
lowed the female victim herself to bring the suit in her own name." 4
More often, however, the spouse of the female victim would bring
suit against the seducer based upon the tort theories of alienation
of affections or criminal conversation.' 15 An action of alienation of
affections involved a situation in which another person intentionally
seduced the wife in order to encourage her to separate from her
husband. 16 Criminal conversation was an action requiring proof of
marriage and adulterous intercourse.'"
The actions of seduction, alienation of affections and criminal
conversation were abolished in most jurisdictions either by statute
or judicial decision.' 18 Grounding their actions on public policy,
legislatures abolished these actions in order to prevent extortion or
blackmail between spouses and to prevent innocent people from
having to defend against fraudulent or meritless litigation. 19 In
LIS Cotton v. Kambly, 300 N.W.2d 627, 628 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (citing Savage v.
Embrey, 184 N.W. 503, 505 {Mich. 1921)).
"4 Id.
"5 See Nicholson v. Han, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968). In modern cases,
the spouse of a victim is not able to sue the therapist unless he was also a patient of the
therapist and therefore himself a victim of malpractice. Weaver v. Union Carbide, 378 S.E.2d
105, 107 (W. Va.), aff'd, 873 F.2d 78, 79 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Richard H. v. Larry D., 243
Cal. Rptr. 807, 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Horak v. Bilis, 474 N.E.2d 13, 17 (III. App. Ct.
1985); Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 584 A.2d 69, 74 (Md. 1991). Courts have reasoned that
the therapist owes a clear duty to both his patients, husband and wife, to engage in conduct
that is calculated to improve their mental or emotional well-being. See Richard H., 243 Cal.
Rptr. at 809; Horak, 474 N.E.2d at 17. But see Martino v. Family Serv. Agency, 445 N.E.2d
6, 9 (III. App. Ct. 1982). In one case, the court allowed a patient to maintain an action for
malpractice against his therapist, who had engaged in sexual relations with the patient's wife,
who was not a patient. See Mazza v. Huffaker, 300 S.E.2d 833, 839 (N.C. Ct. App.), petition
denied,.305 S.E.2d 734 (N.C. 1983), reconsideration denied, 313 S.E.2d 160 {N.C. 1984).
"0 Nicholson, 162 N.W.2d at 317.
117 Id.
LIS
 Weaver, 378 S.E.2d at 108. The statutes abolishing these actions are often referred
to as "heart-balm statutes." See POPE & Bounoursos, supra note 2, at 130. Some of the
abolishing statutes were enacted in the 1930s, whereas others were not enacted until much
later. See, e.g., Cotton v. Kambly, 300 N.W.2d 627, 628 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (Michigan
abolished seduction action for women under eighteen in 1935); Weaver, 378 S.E.2d at 108
n.6 {West Virginia abolished alienation of affections action in 1969).
" 9 See Richard H., 243 Cal. Rptr. at 809; Roy v. Hartogs, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1976); Weaver, 378 S.E.2d at 108.
16.
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addition, as views about marriage and women changed, society
began to regard these causes of action as treating women like prop-
erty.' 2° Finally, the abolition of these causes of action has in part
been motivated by the inability of the court system to determine
objectively and fairly the loss in these situations. 12 '
As these causes of action were abolished, courts began to inter-
pret the sexual misconduct complaints as actions for malpractice,
rather than actions fOr seduction, in order to give victims an avenue
of relief.' 22 For example, in the 1976 case of Roy v. Hartogs, the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term held that a patient who
was induced to have sexual intercourse as part of therapy had a
cause of action for malpractice.'" The plaintiff in Hartogs alleged
in the complaint that during the last thirteen months of her treat-
ment with the defendant psychiatrist, he induced her to have sexual
intercourse as part of her prescribed therapy, causing her to sustain
emotional and mental injury.' 24
The court in Hartogs stated that the legislation did not abolish
all causes of action where sexual intercourse contributed to the
ultimate harm. 125 The court reasoned that the harm to the patient
was caused not only by the sexual contact with the therapist, but
also by the therapist's deviation from professionally acceptable con-
duct. 126 Because the complaint alleged that the harm was caused by
the deceptive treatment of the therapist, the court held that the
plaintiff had stated a viable malpractice claim. 12" Thus, although
some of the elements of the abolished causes of action may appear
in the complaint, most courts will look to the substance of the
complaint, rather than its form, to determine whether a cause of
action is viable.' 28
"a See Weaver, 378 S.E.2d at 108 (alienation of affections resembles a "forced sale" of a
spouse's affections).
121 Id.
122 For example, in Cotton v. Kambly, 300 N.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980),
the court stated: "We see no reason for distinguishing between this type of malpractice and
others, such as improper administration of a drug or a defective operation. In each situation,
the essence of the claim is the doctor's departure from proper standards of medical practice."
See also Roy v. Hartogs, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (1976).





In See, e.g., Cotton v. Kambly, 300 N.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (court
looked at "the essence of the claim" and found cause of action for malpractice); Weaver v.
Union Carbide, 378 S.E.2d 105, 109 (W. Va. 1989) (court looked to "the substance of the
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Today, the majority of suits for sexual exploitation by a psy-
chotherapist are based directly on medical malpractice claims. 129 In
order to prevail in a malpractice suit, the plaintiff must show that
a duty existed on the part of the therapist toward the patient, that
the therapist departed from the proper standards of practice, and
that some harm resulted to the plaintiff that was caused by the
therapist's actions.'" In examining the first element of malpractice,
that of duty, courts have characterized the relationship between
doctor and patient as a fiduciary relationship, analogous to a guard-
ian-ward relationship."' In such a relationship, the guardian cannot
waive performance of this duty.'" As medical specialists, therapists
owe their patients the same duty of care as do other medical profes-
sionals.'" Such duty requires that the specialist engage only in
activities that are calculated to improve the patient's mental or
emotional well-being, and refrain from conduct that carries with it
a foreseeable risk of emotional harm to the patient.'" In addition,
at least one court has held that an individual holding himself out
to be a psychologist will be held to the same professional standard
of care as if he were indeed a psychologist.'" The law is well-settled
that such a duty exists between psychotherapists and their pa-
tients. "6
The second element of the malpractice claim requires that the
plaintiff demonstrate that the therapist's conduct departed from
plaintiff's complaint and not merely to its form" and found cause of action for malpractice).
But see Nicholson v. Han, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968) (court looked at "the
gist of the action" and found it to be for abolished alienation of affections and criminal
conversation causes of action, and affirmed trial court's granting of summary judgment).
122 See, e.g., Cotton, 300 N.W.2d at 628-29; Hartogs, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 588 (1976). Medical
malpractice is defined as "the failure of a member of the medical profession, employed to
treat a case professionally, to fulfill the duty to exercise that degree of skill, care and diligence
exercised by members of the same profession . . in light of the present state of medical
science." Cotton, 300 N.W.2d at 628 (citing Kambas v. St. Joseph's Mercy Hosp., 205 N.W.2d
431, 434 (Mich. 1973)).
130 See Cotton, 300 N.W.2d at 628-29; Hartogs, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 588; Omer v. Edgren,
685 P.2d 635, 637 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
'" Omer, 685 P.2d at 636.
IS2 Id. (citing Roy v. Hartogs, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297, 299 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975)). Courts
have stated that the ward is incapable of consenting when the guardian acts as seducer. See,
e.g., Omer, 685 P.2d at 636.
151 Omer, 685 P.2d at 636; see also Horak v. Biris, 474 N.E.2d 13, 17 (III App. Ct. 1985).
' 5  Horak, 474 N.E.2d at 17.
' SS See, e.g., Corgan v. Muehling, 522 N.E.2d 153, 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), aff 'd, 574
N.E.2d 6022 (III. 1991).
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standard, acceptable procedures.'" Some courts have determined,
based on the therapist's mishandling of the transference phenom-
enon, that sexual misconduct is malpractice.'" At least one of these
courts reasoned that in order to benefit from therapy the patient
must trust the therapist.'" Courts also recognize that as the thera-
peutic relationship develops, the patient may begin to experience
transference, expressing a strong need for parental love and guid-
ance. 140 A proper handling of the transference phenomenon may
lead to a resolution of the patient's emotional confficts. 141 A therapist
who seeks to gratify his own personal needs, however, has departed
from professional standards of care and harms the patient by vio-
lating her trust. 142 In addition to focusing upon transference as a
breach in the standard of care, courts acknowledge that the medical
authorities themselves are nearly unanimous in considering thera-
pist-patient sexual contact to be malpractice."' Thus, courts look to
the mishandling of the transference phenomenon, as well as to the
general consensus of the psychotherapeutic community, to deter-
mine what constitutes a departure from the proper standard of
care.
This departure from acceptable standards of practice may oc-
cur when the therapist deliberately manipulates the patient.'" In
such situations, the therapist may induce the patient into sexual
relations under the guise of treatment, telling her the sexual contact
is part of her prescribed therapy."' The sexual acts may occur
during the therapy session, and in one case the therapist labeled
these acts as "relaxation exercises. " 146 In these cases, in which the
17 See, e.g., Cotton v. Karnbly, 300 N.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
18 See, e.g., St. Paul Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Minn. 1990);
Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 761 (Mo. 1968); L.L. v. Medical Protective Co., 362
N.W.2d 174, 178 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984),
"5 Medical Protective, 362 N.W.2d at 177.
10 See Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986); Medical Protective,
362 N,W.2d at 177.
' 41 Medical Protective, 362 N.W.2d at 177.
145 Id. at 178.
'41 Id. at 176; see also Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1365; Love, 459 N.W.2d at 700.
144 Cotton v. Kamhly, 300 N.W.2d 627, 627 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Roy v. Hartogs, 381
N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
145 Sharpies v. State, 793 P.2d 175, 176 and n.1 (Haw. 1990); Cotton, 300 N.W.2d at 627;
Cares v. New Mexico Bd. of Psychologist Examiners, 798 P.2d 190, 191 (N.M. 1990); Hartogs,
381 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
146 See, e.g., Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry, 329 N.W.2d 306, 308 (Minn.
1982) (plaintiff sought therapy for chronic headaches and back pain; relaxation exercises
evolved into body massages and sexual encounters); Medical Protective, 362 N.W.2d at 175
(sexual acts occurred during therapy sessions).
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sexual contact occurred during therapy, courts have held that this
behavior clearly departs from acceptable therapeutic practice.' 4 r
In fact, even in cases in which the sexual contact occurred
outside of therapy and over an extended period of time, courts
have also held that sexual contact between the therapist and the
patient constitutes malpractice. 148 For example, in the 1968 case of
Zipkin v. Freeman, the Missouri Supreme Court held that a psychi-
atrist's personal and sexual involvement with his patient, which
occurred outside the office, was malpractice. 149 In Zipkin, the patient
engaged in a sexual relationship with the therapist, attended nude
swimming parties with the therapist's friends, went on overnight
trips with him, and eventually moved into a residence on his prop-
erty) 8° The court reasoned that the therapist's actions departed
from the proper standard of conduct because he had mishandled
the transference phenomenon)." The court further stated that the
therapist would have damaged the patient even if the overnight
trips were chaperoned, the swimming was done in bathing suits,
and "there had been ballroom dancing instead of sexual rela-
tions." 152 Thus, at least one court has found a departure from the
proper standard of conduct, based on the mishandling of the trans-
ference phenomenon, even when the improper conduct takes place
outside the therapy session)"
For the final element of malpractice, the plaintiff must prove
that she suffered some harm and that the harm was proximately
caused by the therapist's behavior)" Courts have accepted the no-
tion that patients who are sexually involved with their therapists are
at risk of sustaining some type of emotional damage from the
relationship) 88 In many cases, this emotional suffering results in
147 Marston, 329 N.W.2d at 307, 308 (case was reversed and remanded on other grounds);
Medical Protective, 362 N.W.2d at 178.
Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 757-59, 761 (Mo. 1968) (inappropriate contact
occurred over a number of years, spanning a range of social activities; patient resided on
psychiatrist's property); Olson v. Connerly, 445 N.W.2d 706, 708 (Wis. Ct. App, 1989) (sexual
contact occurred outside of office), aff'd, 457 N.W.2d 479, 484 (Wis. 1990).
/49 436 S.W.2d at 757-59, 761.
' 50 Id. at 757-59. In addition, the therapist advised the patient on her personal financial
dealings. Id. at 758.
151 Id. at 761.
152 Id.
153
 Id.; see also Olson, 457 N.W.2d at 480-81.
154 See Roy v. Hartogs, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Omer v. Edgren,
685 P.2d 635, 637 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
155 See, e.g., Omer, 685 P.2d at 638; L.L. v. Medical Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d 174, 178
(Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
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tangible costs, such as medical expenses for hospitalization or sub-
sequent therapy, or lost wages.m Although traditionally courts have
considered such harm difficult to prove, they have generally allowed
damages to be stated in terms of mental and emotional suffering,
as well as injury to reputation and personal humiliation, without
requiring proof of accompanying physical injuries or monetary
losses.'"
Once the plaintiff establishes the harm, the causal connection
between the sexual relationship and the patient's condition is often
established by an expert witness, such as another therapist.' 58 For
example, in the 1984 case of Omer v. Edgren, the Washington Court
of Appeals held that, for the purpose of a summary judgment
motion, sufficient facts established a causal connection between the
therapist's breach of trust and the patient's emotional condition,' 59
In Omer, the patient, after engaging in a sexual relationship with
her psychiatrist, sought treatment from another therapist. 61 0 The
new therapist, acting as an expert witness on behalf of the plaintiff,
testified that her suicidal desires were caused by feelings of guilt
arising from her relationship with her former therapist. 16 ' The
court accepted the current therapist's testimony as sufficient to
establish a causal relationship between the prior therapist's conduct
and the patient's present harm, and therefore reversed the sum-
mary judgment for the defendant and remanded the case for
trial.' 62 Thus, a plaintiff can prove the causation element of her
malpractice claim by providing expert testimony from a therapist
who has examined her. 163
1 " See Omer, 685 P.2d at 638 (damages may be awarded despite plaintiff's testimony
that she suffered no loss with respect to lost earnings, medical expenses or marital difficulties;
amount may be in fact-finders discretion); Olson, 445 N.W.2d at 708-09 (damages awarded
for future pain and suffering and past medical and hospital expenses).
157 Omer, 685 P.2d at 638. The court noted that although injury flowing from the alleged
relationship may be difficult to prove, it "may be as real as that type of injury which can be
proven with mathematical certainty." Id. See also Corgan v. Muchling, 522 N.E.2d 153, 159
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988), aff'd, 574 N.E.2d 602 (III. 1991).
155 See, e.g., Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 760 (Mo. 1968) (subsequent examining
therapist testified as to the effect of the relationship); Omer at 637-38 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984)
(subsequent treating therapist testified as to the effect of the relationship).
159 685 P.2d at 638.
16° Id. at 636.
L(/1 Id. at 637-38.
167 Id. at 638.
155 See Zipkin, 436 S.W.2d at 760 (court held insurance company liable based on harm
established by expert's testimony); Omer, 685 P.2d at 637-38 (court accepted expert's testi-
mony and reversed summary judgment granted to defendant).
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In addition to malpractice claims, patients have also sought
damages for infliction of emotional distress as a result of the ther-
apist's negligence.' 64 Courts have handled these cases differently,
depending on the current state of tort law in their jurisdictions.' 65
Some courts require, or at least prefer, an accompanying physical
injury in order to support a claim for emotional distress.' 66
For example, in 1989, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in Olson
v. Connerly held that a plaintiff could plead a cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress only if the therapist's ac-
tions resulted in physical injury.' 67 In Olson, the patient suffered
"panic attacks" at the thought of the sexual involvement with her
therapist. 168 These panic attacks caused the plaintiff to react phys-
ically; the plaintiff suffered extreme abdominal pain, shortness of
breath and gagging.' 69 Although the court acknowledged that there
may be some exceptions to the Wisconsin physical injury rule, such
as emotional distress that results from intentional conduct or that
is caused by wrongful acts that are inherently likely to cause severe
distress, the court did not rest its findings on these exceptions
because the case included an accompanying physical injury.'"
Other jurisdictions have examined an emotional distress claim
in terms of the "zone of danger" rule, which requires for a cause
of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress that the plain-
tiff must allege that the acts of the defendant put her in reasonable
fear for her own safety.'" Even within one jurisdiction, however,
there is disagreement regarding the applicability of this rule to
164
	 Corgan v. Muehling, 522 N.E.2d 153, 154 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), off 'd, 574 N.E.2d
602 (111. 1991); Hammond v. Lane, 515 N.E.2d 828, 829 (III. App. Ct. 1987); Olson v.
Connerly, 445 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 457 N.W.2d 479, 484 (Wis.
1990).
166 See, e.g., Corgan, 522 N.E.2d at 159 (plaintiff could recover for emotional distress
because she was direct victim of malpractice—"zone of danger" rule inapplicable); cf. Ham-
mond, 515 N.E.2d at 830 (plaintiff must show she was within "zone of danger" or feared for
her own safety in order to recover for emotional distress); Olson, 445 N.W.2d at 712 (plaintiff
can recover for emotional distress in light of accompanying physical injury).
166 See, e.g., Olson, 445 N.W.2d at 712. The public policy objective of requiring an
accompanying physical injury is to prevent fraudulent claims. See id.
161 Id. (court upheld trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
evidence).
166 Id.
169 Id. The court accepted the plaintiff's claims of physical symptoms based on the
corroborating testimony of her psychologist and psychiatrist. Id.
"0 Id.
171
 Hammond v. Lane, 515 N.E.2d 828, 830 (III. App. Ct. 1987).
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sexual exploitation cases. "2 In the 1987 case of Hammond v. Lane,
the Illinois Appellate Court held that a patient had not successfully
pleaded a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress.'" In Hammond, the patient, who sought treatment for psy-
chological and psychiatric disorders, claimed that she had sexual
contact with her doctor on four occasions.'" In applying the zone
of danger rule, the court reasoned that the plaintiff had failed to
allege that she was endangered or had feared for her own safety
during the sexual contact and therefore the plaintiff did not suc-
cessfully plead a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress.' 78
In 1988, however, the same court held in Corgan v. Muehling
that to plead an action for psychologist malpractice that results only
in emotional distress, the plaintiff need not demonstrate that she
was put in fear of physical injury. 17" In Corgan, an unregistered
therapist who practiced psychology was accused of having sexual
relations with his patient during treatment.' 77 The patient alleged
that the therapist's actions caused her to suffer fear, shame, humil-
iation and guilt, and that, as a result, she had to undergo intensive
psychotherapeutic care.'"
The Corgan court stated that a court could not justify requiring
the plaintiff to demonstrate physical manifestations of her emo-
tional trauma.' 79 The court reasoned that the "zone of danger" rule
should apply only to negligence suits brought by injured bystanders,
rather than to direct victims of malpractice, such as patients who
are sexually exploited by their psychotherapists.'" The court fur-
ther reasoned that requiring patients to demonstrate fear of phys-
ical injury would make it too difficult for those individuals to plead
psychologist malpractice if the only resulting injury was emotional
harm.' 8 '
"7 See Corgan v. Muehling, 522 N.E.2d 153,159 (III. App. Ct. 1988), aff'd, 574 N.E.2d
602 (111.1991) (plaintiff not required to demonstrate that she feared physical injury). But see
Hammond, 515 N.E.2d at 830 (plaintiff must demonstrate that she was endangered or feared
for her own safety).
173 515 N.E.2d at 830.
174
 Id. at 829.
175 Id. at 830.
173 522 N.E.2d at 159.
"7 Id. at 154.
173 Id.
'79 Id. at 159.
1 " Id. at 158-59.
' 5' Id. at 159.
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In sum, most suits for sexual misconduct are based on a theory
of malpractice.' 82 . Courts have determined that sexual misconduct
is malpractice based on the mishandling of the transference phe-
nomenon and on the standards set by the psychotherapeutic com-
'munity. 188 Because the consensus of the psychotherapeutic com-
munity is that therapists who engage in sexual relations with patients
depart from the standard of professional care, testimony at most
trials will likely focus upon whether the sexual conduct actually
occurred.'" In addition to malpractice, patients may successfully
plead emotional distress due to the therapist's negligence.'"
C. Insurance Company Responses
Most practicing therapists carry malpractice insurance.'" A typ-
ical policy covers the therapist for "damages arising out of the
performance of professional services rendered or which should
have been rendered . . . . "187 Most malpractice insurance policies
require the insurer to defend the therapist facing a malpractice suit,
as well as to pay the damages arising from the suit. 188
In cases of sexual misconduct, insurance companies often bring
a declaratory judgment action forcing the court to rule on whether
it is liable for coverage.' 89 The insurance company typically argues
IN See, e.g., Cotton v. Kambly, 300 N.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Roy v.
Hartogs, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
' 82 See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986); St. Paul
Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 700, 702 (Minn. 1990); Zipkin v. Freeman,
436 S.W.2d 753, 761 (Mo. 1968); L.L. v. Medical Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d 174, 176, 178
(Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
1 " See Medical Protective, 362 N.W.2d at 176 ("Medical authorities are nearly unanimous
in considering sexual contact between therapists and patients to be malpractice."). See generally
POPE & BOUOOOTSOS, supra note 2, at 129.
IN See, e.g., Corgan v. Muehling, 522 N.E.2d 153, 159 (III. App. Ct. 1988), aff'd, 574
N.E.2d 602 (Ill. 1991); Olson v. Connerly, 445 N.W.2d 706, 712 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd,
457 N.W.2d 479, 484 (Wis. 1990).
IN See, e.g., Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kambly, 319 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)
(dispute as to coverage of psychiatrist's insurance); Love, 459 N.W.2d at 699 {dispute as to
coverage of psychologist's professional liability insurance); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
D.H.L., 459 N.W.2d 704, 705 (Minn. 1990) (dispute as to coverage of marriage counselor's
professional liability insurance).
1 " St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 296 S.E.2d 126, 127 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982)
(emphasis omitted).
'" See, e.g., id., at 127; Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 754 {Mo. 1968).
in See, e.g., Love, 459 N.W.2d at 699. This action is separate from the patient's mal-
practice suit against the therapist. The action is usually, though not always, prior to the main
suit. Sometimes, rather than a declaratory judgment action, the therapist sues the insurance
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that sexual contact between a therapist and patient is personal, not
professional, behavior, and therefore does not constitute malprac-
tice.'" In most cases, courts have rejected this argument, holding
that insurance companies are liable under the policies. 19 ' In re-
sponse to these rulings, some insurance companies have placed
exclusionary provisions for sexual misconduct or caps on damages
for sexual misconduct claims.' 92
In upholding the liability of the insurance companies, courts
have focused on the language of the malpractice policy, as well as
the therapist's mishandling of the transference phenomenon in the
course of rendering professional services.'" In the 1990 case of St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Love, for example, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota held that an insurance company was required
to provide coverage for a therapist who engaged in a sexual rela-
tionship with his female patient because this conduct constituted
malpractice.'" In Love, the plaintiff initially consulted a psychologist
to resolve marital difficulties and issues surrounding childhood sex-
ual abuse.'" She ultimately engaged in sexual intimacies with him
for two months.' 96 When the patient and her husband, who had
company after presenting his own defense. See, e.g., Hartogs v. Employers Mutual Ins. Co.
of Wis., 391 N.Y.S.2d 962, 963 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
19° See, e.g., Love, 459 N.W.2d at 699.
191 See, e.g., id. at 702; Zipkin, 936 S.W.2d at 761. Depending upon the terms of the
policy, the insurer will have to defend the therapist (or assume those costs), pay damages to
the patient, or both. See, e.g., Love, 459 N.W.2d at 702 (insurer liable for damages); Zipkin,
436 S.W.2d at 761 (insurer liable to defend insured and pay damages).
192 See Pore & BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 2, at 28, 158. For example, one typical mental
health counselor's professional liability policy provides:
Sexual Misconduct—The total limit of the Company's liability hereunder shall
not exceed $25,000 in the aggregate for all damages with respect to the total
of all claims against any Insured(s) involving any actual or alleged erotic physical
contact, or attempt there at proposal thereof: (a) by any Insured or by any
other person for whom any Insured may be legally liable; and (b) with or to
any former or current patient or client of any Insured, or with or to any relative
of or member of the same household as any said patient or client, or with or
to any person with whom said patient or client or relative has an affectionate
personal relationship.
American Home Assurance Company, 1989 Renewal Form 3 (1989).
195 See, e.g., Love, 459 N.W.2d at 700; Zipkin, 436 S.W.2d at 761. Another court has
opted to wait for the facts to be adjudicated at trial, requiring the insurer to render a defense
for the therapist, but waiting to order the payment of damages until the claim was resolved
at trial. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Go. v. Mitchell, 296 S.E.2d 126, 127, 129 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1982).
194 459 N.W.2d at 702.
'95 Id.
199 Id.
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also been a patient, filed suit against the therapist, the insurance
company commenced a declaratory judgment action to resolve the
coverage issue.' 97
The Love court reasoned that in order to determine whether
the sexual contact was malpractice, it should not only consider the
sexual act itself, but also the treatment preceding and subsequent
to the act. 198 The court further reasoned that in order for the
insurer to be liable, a substantial connection must exist between the
professional services, provided or withheld, and the sexual con-
duct.' 99
 The court noted that because the sexual relationship arose
out of the mishandling of the transference phenomenon, which
occurred prior to the actual sexual contact, it was related to the
professional treatment.'" In addition, the court noted that the sex-
ual relationship worsened the plaintiff's emotional condition, the
very condition for which she sought treatment. 20 ' Thus, the Love
court concluded that the insurer was liable because the sexual ac-
tivity must have arisen from the transference phenomenon, which
is part of the professional treatment; the sexual activity was there-
fore malpractice. 202
In the 1968 case of Zipkin v. Freeman, the Supreme Court of
Missouri used similar reasoning in holding that the psychiatrist's
insurance company was obligated to defend the malpractice suit
and pay damages to the patient. 203 In Zipkin, a woman seeking
treatment from a psychiatrist for diarrhea and headaches subse-
quently moved into an apartment over his office, invested in his
197 Id.
199 Id. at 700-01.
' 99 Id. at 701.
299
 Id. at 702.
201 Id. at 701. The court distinguished the present case from a case in which a physician
engaged in sexual activities with three young boys who were seeking treatment for routine
physical injuries, not emotional problems. Id. at 700-01. In that situation, the Supreme Court
of Minnesota held that no insurance coverage was available because the "sexual acts had
absolutely nothing to do with either the patients' problems or the prescribed medical treat-
ment." Id. at 701.
202 Id, at 702. The court in Love did note that cases may arise where the malpractice
does not arise from the mishandling of the transference phenomenon. Id. In a similar fact
situation, the Supreme Court. of Minnesota in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. D.H.L.
remanded the case to the trial court so that expert testimony could be offered regarding the
transference phenomenon in light of the Love decision. 459 N.W.2d 704, 706 (Minn. 1990);
see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 296 S.E.2d 126, 129 (Ca. Ct. App. 1982).
20' 436 S.W.2d 753, 761 (Mo. 1968). The court held that the insurance company was
responsible for the costs of the therapist's malpractice defense, although the malpractice suit
had already taken place and the insurer had refused to defend. Id.
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financial dealings and became his "mistress." 204 The therapist's in-
surance policy stated that the insurer was liable to pay damages
"based on" professional services rendered or that should have been
rendered."' The court interpreted the phrase "based on" to include
damages "resulting from, or caused by, or due to," these services. 20 G
The court reasoned that the sexual relationship between the ther-
apist and the patient arose from the mishandling of the transference
phenomenon, "a reaction the psychiatrists anticipate and which
must be handled properly," and which is clearly part of rendering
professional services. 207 The court noted that the transference phe-
nomenon was overwhelmingly shown in the evidence and docu-
mented by expert testimony. 208 Many courts use the mishandling of
the transference phenomenon as a means of establishing that sexual
contact in a therapy situation is inextricably linked to the providing
of professional services. 200
Findings of liability for insurance companies have withstood a
number of challenges raised by the companies. First, insurance
companies often rely on a wide range of public policy objectives,
arguing, for example, that wrongdoers should not be able to profit
from their own bad acts by escaping payment of damages.m Sec-
ond, companies have argued that the malpractice insurance policy
itself has a specific provision that excludes coverage for the com-
mission of criminal acts. 2 " Finally, one company argued that public
policy dictates that such an exclusionary provision should be implied
in the malpractice policy even if it is not expressly included.212
Courts, however, have not been influenced by the public policy
arguments advanced by the insurers. 2 " In Vigilant Insurance Co. v.
Kambly, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that none of the public
2°4 Id. at 755, 759.
200
	 at 754.
206 Id. at 761.
2°7 Id.
2°2 Id.
200 See, e.g., id.; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Minn.
1990). But see Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kambly, 319 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). In
Kambly, the court held that an insurance company would be liable for malpractice damages
if a trial court found malpractice. The Kambly court did not discuss whether transference
needed to be established for the insurance company to be liable. Id.
210 Id. at 384.
4r"
	
v. Medical Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984); see also
Kambly, 319 N.W.2d at 385.
212 See Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. McCabe, 556 F. Supp. 1342, 1352 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
274 See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 296 S.E,2d 126, 128 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1982); Kambly, 319 N.W.2d at 385.
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policy considerations raised by the insurance company applied to
the therapist's actions. 214 The insurance company first argued that
it should not have to indemnify the therapist because an insured
should not be permitted to profit from his wrongdoing. 215 Second,
the company argued that to permit recovery would encourage the
commission of unlawful acts. 216 The court responded to the first
argument by noting that it was not the wrongdoer who would
benefit, but rather the victim, by receiving compensation for her
injuries."' The court also rejected the second argument, reasoning
that it is unlikely that the therapist was persuaded to engage in
sexual relations with his patient in reliance on his insurance pol-
icy. 218 Thus, despite the public policy arguments raised by the in-
surance company, the court held that the insurance company would
be liable if a finding of malpractice results at trial. 219
In another case, however, a court, basing its decision in part
on public policy, did not require the insurance company to pay the
costs of the therapist's suit. 220 In the 1977 case of Hartogs v. Employers
Mutual Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, the Supreme Court of New York
held that the insurance company was not required to reimburse the
defendant for legal costs after a judgment was rendered against
him for having sexual relations with his patient under the guise of
therapy. 221 In Employers Mutual, the psychiatrist brought suit against
his malpractice insurer, seeking to recover his costs and expenses
in defending a malpractice action. 222 The Employers Mutual court
reasoned that the therapist's actions were motivated by his own
desire for personal satisfaction, rather than by a desire to serve the
patient professionally. 228 The court noted, however, that the patient
believed that the doctor's actions constituted medical treatment. 224
" 4 319 N.W.2d at 382, 385.
215 Id. at 384.
16 Id.
117
 Id. at 385.
21B
219 Id.
22° See Hartogs v. Employers Mutual Ins. Co. of Wis., 391 N.Y.S.2d 962, 965 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1977).
22L Id. At trial it was established that the psychiatrist had attempted to "cure" his patient's
lesbianism by personally administering multiple doses of "fornicatus Hartogus" over a period
of thirteen months. Id. at 963.
222 Id. The psychiatrist plaintiff also sought from his malpractice insurance company
legal fees for his bankruptcy proceedings, damages for humiliation arising from the bank-
ruptcy proceedings, and punitive damages. Id.
22A Id. at 964.
224 Id.
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Therefore, the court concluded that although the therapist's actions
were considered malpractice in the patient's suit against him and
the therapist was personally liable for damages, the conduct did not
constitute malpractice under the insurance policy. 225 The Employers
Mutual court refused to indemnify the therapist for his unethical
behavior. 226 The court reasoned that, as a matter of public policy,
courts should not "allow themselves to be used to enforce illicit or
immoral or unconscionable purposes." 227
Insurance companies also contend that the language of the
policy excludes coverage for the commission of criminal acts. 228 In
the 1984 case of L.L. v. Medical Protective Co., for example, the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that a policy exclusion for criminal
acts did not bar coverage for a victim in a case of sexual miscon-
duct. 229 In Medical Protective, the patient appealed from summary
judgment that dismissed the malpractice insurance company from
an action against her psychiatrist. 250 The patient claimed that the
psychiatrist engaged in acts of sexual intercourse with her during
therapy. 23 ' The insurance company argued that coverage should be
barred by a policy exclusion for "payment of damages . . . if said
damages are in consequence of the performance of a criminal act
"252
. . . .
The Medical Protective court rejected the insurance company's
claim that the sexual acts could be considered criminal and thereby
excluded from policy coverage. 233 The court reasoned that the
plaintiff had alleged negligence or malpractice, rather than criminal
223 Id. at 964-65.
220 Id. at 965.
227 Id. Another court noted that the Employers Mutual court may have been influenced
by the fact that the insurer, prior to the psychiatrist's suit for legal fees, had settled out of
court with the patient, thereby serving the important policy objective of protecting the victim.
See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 296 S.E.2d 126, 128 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
Other courts have attempted to distinguish Employers Mutual in various ways. See id. (distin-
guished on the basis of different facts); Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. McCabe, 556 F. Supp.
1342, 1351 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (distinguished on the basis of the language of the insurance
policy).
22° L.L. v. Medical Protective Co., 362 N.W. 2d 174, 178 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984). The
insurance company contended that the "criminal act" was a violation of a general sexual
misconduct statute, as opposed to one of the new criminal statutes that specifically applied
to psychotherapist-patient sexual relations. See id; see also Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kambly, 319
N.W.2d 382, 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
229 Kambly, 362 N.W.2d at 179.
23° Id. at 175.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 178.
233 Id. at 178-79.
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behavior, in her complaint. 234 The court further reasoned that the
language of the insurance policy was ambiguous and did not indi-
cate whether coverage would include acts of malpractice that could
also be defined as criminal. 233 The court stated that when the mean-
ing of a policy is unclear, it should be construed in favor of cover-
age.236 Finally, the court noted that the professional policy was
intended to compensate persons who were injured by the therapist's
acts of malpractice. 237 Thus, the court concluded that such an ex-
clusion did not bar the coverage. 238
If an exclusion for criminal or intentional conduct is not explicit
in the policy, courts may be hesitant to imply one absent compelling
public policy considerations. 239 In the 1983 case of Aetna Life and
Casualty Co. v. McCabe, the United States District Court for the
District of Pennsylvania held that even if the therapist's conduct is
intentional, it would not imply in the malpractice policy an exclusion
for such behavior.") In McCabe, the patient, who sought help for
asthma and anxiety, became sexually involved with her doctor six
months after treatment began."' The sexual relationship continued
for approximately five years and they lived together during part of
this time. 242 The doctor continued to prescribe drugs for the pa-
tient.243 After the patient brought suit against the doctor, the insur-
ance company filed a declaratory judgment seeking a declaration
of non-coverage under the psychiatrist's malpractice policy. 244
Because the policy contained no exclusion, the court considered
whether to imply one by examining several factors, such as whether
the policy was procured in contemplation of the wrongful act,
whether the existence of the policy promoted the wrongful act,
234
 Id, at 178.
233





 See Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. McCabe, 556 F. Supp. 1342, 1352 (E.D. 1 3a.1983);
see also Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 626 F. Supp. 262, 266-.67 (S.D.N.Y.
1986). Noting a New York public policy that prohibits insurance coverage for conduct
intended to injure, the Vigilant court did not find evidence that the therapist intended to
harm his patients. Vigilant, 626 F. Supp. at 267. The court, therefore, refused to accept the
insurance company's argument that public policy barred coverage. Id. Awareness of a poten-
tial harm, the court stated, is not equivalent to intending that harm. Id.
240 556 F. Supp. at 1352, 1353.
241 Id. at 1346.
242 Id.
243 Id.
444 Id. at 1344.
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whether denying coverage under the act would be a deterrent, and
whether the policy protects the insured from the consequences of
his wrongful act. 245 Because the case did not implicate the first three
considerations, the court noted that the only policy consideration
that might be relevant was whether the existence of the insurance
policy protects the therapist from the consequences of his wrongful
act.246 The court reasoned that although requiring the insurance
company to pay damages would relieve the defendant of the finan-
cial consequences of his acts, the stronger policy consideration is to
compensate innocent victims of malpractice. 247 Thus, the McCabe
court concluded that because the policy did not explicitly exclude
coverage for intentional conduct, no waiver should•be implied. 248
In sum, courts most often hold that general malpractice insur-
ance policies include coverage for sexual misconduct. 249 Courts usu-
ally base these decisions on the mishandling of the transference
phenomenon.25° Many courts will not allow their decisions to be
influenced by the public policy considerations raised by the insur-
ance companies. 25 ' In addition, courts have found that a specific
exclusion for general criminal acts does not bar coverage. 252
D. Criminal Statutes
Prior to the recent criminalization of sexual exploitation by
psychotherapists, the most common charge for prosecution for this
type of conduct was rape. 253 These cases usually involved extreme
situations, such as overt objections by the patient or intercourse
without the patient's knowledge.254 In one case, a psychiatrist was
2" Id. at 1352-53.
24' Id. at 1353.
247
249 Id.
24 9 See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Minn. 1990);
Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 761 (Mo. 1968).
2" See, e.g., Love, 459 N.W.2d at 702; Zipkeri, 436 S.W.2d at 761.
251 See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 296 S.E.2d 126, 128 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1982); Vigilant Ins. Go. v. Kambly, 319 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
252
	
319 N.W.2d at 385; L.L. v. Medical Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d 174, 179
(Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
255 See, e.g., Bernstein v. Board of Medical Examiners, 22 Cal. Rptr. 419, 420 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1962) (psychiatrist convicted of statutory rape of sixteen-year old girl); Eberhart v.
State, 34 N.E. 637, 637 (Ind. 1883) (doctor convicted of rape); State v. Ely, 194 P. 988, 988
(Wash. 1921) (doctor convicted of rape).
254
	 34 N.E. at 638 (extremely young patient resisted sexual intercourse); Ely,
194 P. at 988-89 (patient did not consent and was unaware of sexual abuse in course of
medical examination).
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found guilty of statutory rape of a sixteen-year-old gir1. 255 Com-
mentators have suggested that the relatively low number of criminal
prosecutions demonstrated a reluctance by law enforcement agen-
cies to press criminal charges against therapists who engaged in
sexual activity with their patients. 256
Many professionals, including both researchers and therapists,
advocate crimirialization of all sexual contact as a means of curtailing
the increasing number of therapists who sexually exploit their pa-
tients. 257 It was not until recently, however, that states began to pass
criminal statutes that impose harsh penalties on psychotherapists
who become sexually involved with their patients. 259 At least seven
states, including California, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Minnesota,
North Dakota and Wisconsin, have enacted such statutes. 259 At least
two other states, Massachusetts and New Mexico, are deliberating
about whether to pass such legislation. 26° The purpose underlying
the statutes, according to one court, is to protect vulnerable patients
by allowing them to place their trust in competent professionals. 26 '
The criminal statutes are often far-reaching, encompassing a
broad range of situations of sexual misconduct. 262 A typical statute,
such as Wisconsin's, applies to all individuals who practice or hold
themselves out to practice psychotherapy, whether licensed or
not. 265
 The Wisconsin statute defines "therapist" to include physi-
255 Bernstein, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
256
 Stone, supra note 80, at 1138.
2" Masters & Johnson, Principles of the New Sex Therapy, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 548, 553
(1976).
255 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 729 (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. 18-3-405.5
(1986); 1990 FLA. 1...Aws ch. 70; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17—A, 253 (West Supp. 1990);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.344, 609.345 (West Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-06.1
(West Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.22 (West Supp. 1990).
259 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 729 (West 1990); Cow. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.5
(1986); 1990 FLA. LAWS ch. 70; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17—A, § 253 (West Supp. 1990);
MINN. STAT. ANN, §§ 609.344, 609.345 (West Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-06.1
(West Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.22 (West Supp. 1990).
26° See Daniel Coleman, New Guidelines Issued on Patient-Therapist Sex, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
20, 1990, at B21.
461 See State v. Dutton, 450 N.W.2d 189, 194 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
262 For example, the Wisconsin statute states:
Any person who is or holds himself or herself out to be a therapist and
who intentionally has sexual contact with a patient or client during any ongoing
therapist-patient or therapist-client relationship, regardless of whether it occurs
during any treatment, consultation, interview or examination, is guilty of a Class
D felony. Consent is not an issue in an action under this subsection.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.22(2) (West Supp. 1990); see also N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-20-06.1
(Supp. 1989).
263 Wits. STAT. ANN. 940.22(2) (West Supp. 1990).
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clans, psychologists, social workers, nurses, chemical dependency
counselors and clergy. 2" The statute covers sexual contact that oc-
curs during the therapist-patient relationship, regardless of whether
it arises during treatment, consultation, interview or examination. 26'
The type of sexual contact covered by the Wisconsin statute includes
intercourse, oral sex, sodomy and intimate touching. 266 Although
the Wisconsin statute does not include sexual contact with former
patients, other statutes do prohibit such contact when the patient
remains emotionally dependent upon the therapist or when the
relationship was terminated primarily in order to engage in sexual
conduct.267 Thus, these statutes generally define sexual misconduct
as encompassing a broad range of sexual behavior and they apply
to virtually all types of practicing therapists.
Because most of the statutes regard therapist-patient sex as a
felony, the penalties for an offense usually include imprisonment
or a fine. 268 For example, a therapist who engages in an act of sexual
intercourse in Minnesota may be sentenced to imprisonment for up
to fifteen years or fined up to thirty thousand dollars. 269 Some
2" WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.22(1)(i) (West Supp. 1990). Other statutes have similar or
expanded lists, such as the California statute, which also includes marriage, family, and child
counselors; psychological assistants; marriage, family, and child counselor registered interns;
and associate clinical social workers. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 729 (West 1990).
202 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.22(2) (West Supp. 1990). The Minnesota statute extends
the protection of the statute to acts occurring outside of the therapy session if the patient or
former patient is still emotionally dependent upon the psychotherapist or if sexual penetra-
tion occurred by means of therapeutic deception. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.344(1)(i),
609.345(1)(i) (West Supp. 1991). North Dakota, however, makes the sexual contact criminal
only if it occurs during any treatment, consultation, interview or examination. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-20-06.1 (Supp. 1989).
286 See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.22(5), 940.225(5)(6) (West Supp. 1990), which states that
sexual contact includes: "any intentional touching by the complainant or defendant, either
directly or through clothing by the use of any body part or object, of the complainant's or
defendant's intimate parts .." Most other statutes prohibit similar sexual contacts, but may
distinguish the penalties on the basis of the type of sexual act. See, e.g., Cow. REv. STAT.
§ 18-3-405.5 (1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.344, 609.345 (West Supp. 1991). The Florida
statute, however, limits the prohibited sexual contacts to "the oral, anal, or vaginal penetration
of another by, or contact with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration
of another by any object." 1990 FLA. LAWS ch. 70(4)(c).
207 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 729 (West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.344,
609.345 (West Supp. 1991).
" See, e.g., 1990 FLA. LAWS ch. 70; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17—A, $§ 253, 1252(2)(c),
1301(1)(c) (West Supp. 1990). But see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 729 (West 1990) (statute
provides that the first violation is a misdemeanor); Cow. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.5 (1986)
(statute states that sexual contact, as opposed to sexual penetration or intrusion, is a misde-
meanor).
7" See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(2) (West Supp. 1991). Statutes may impose lesser
penalties. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-32-01(c) (Supp. 1989) (provides for imprison-
ment for up to five years and/or a fine of $5000).
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statutes provides stiffer penalties for subsequent violations. 270 Other
statutes distinguish between the type of sexual act, imposing lesser
penalties for "sexual contact," as opposed to "sexual penetration." 271
Most of the statutes do not allow the defendant to assert consent
as a defense to the action. 272 According to one court, even a "con-
sensual" sexual relationship violates the therapist's duty to the pa-
tient and can therefore be regulated by the state. 273 The elimination
of consent as a defense has been strictly enforced, even in cases in
which it is not explicitly stated in the statute. 274
For example, in the 1990 case of State v. Josephson, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals held that consent could not be used as a defense
even when the statute did not explicitly forbid it. 275 In Josephson,
the defendant therapist engaged in a sexual relationship with his
patient over a period of four years. 276 The defendant argued that
consent remained a defense to the action because the statute did
not explicitly discuss 4. 277 The Josephson court stated that consent is
not a defense under the statute merely because the statute is silent
with regard to this issue. 278 The court reasoned that the legislature
could have required the prosecution to prove lack of consent as an
element of its case, yet it chose not to. 279 In addition, the court held
that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, reasoning that the
27° See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 729 (West 1990) (first offense is misdemeanor;
subsequent violations are punishable by imprisonment or fine); 1990 FLA. LAWS ch. 70 (first
offense is felony of the third degree; subsequent offenses are felonies of the second degree).
2" See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.5 (1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(2)
(West Supp. 1991).
272 For example, the California statute states in part, "in no instance shall consent of the
patient or client be a defense." CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 729 (West 1990); see also COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.5 (1986); 1990 FLA. LAWS ch. 70; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.344,
609.345 (West Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-06.1 (Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.22 (West Supp. 1990). The Maine statute, however, provides that therapy must be
based on "an intimate relationship involving trust and dependency with a substantial potential
for vulnerability and abuse." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17—A, § 253 (West Supp. 1990).
27' State v. Dutton, 450 N.W.2d 189, 193-94 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). In the civil
context, at least one court has stated that patients involved in a sexual relationship with a
therapist are incapable of giving consent. Omer v. Edgren, 685 P.2d 635, 638 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1984) (court noted that sexual relationship is an assault on patient who is arguably
incapable of giving consent).
2" See State v. Josephson, No. 89-2219-CR, 1990 MIS, at *7 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 14,
1990) (unpublished limited precedent opinion).
222 Id.
216
 Id. at *3.
272 Id. at *5.
2" Id. at *7.
222 Id. at *9.
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precise application of the statute is "plain and clear" and gives
therapists fair notice of the conduct that the statute proscribes. 28°
Some controversy has surrounded the elimination of consent
as a defense. 28 ' Private interest groups, such as the Civil Liberties
Union of Massachusetts, have lobbied against this aspect of the
criminal legislation, contending that the elimination of consent as a
defense treats any person who consults a mental health professional
as a child. 282 They argue that such a premise is factually and morally
wrong.283 Furthermore, such groups have argued that the govern-
ment should not be allowed to regulate the private sexual acts of
consenting adults.284 They point to a court decision which held that
even sexual conduct that all members of the community find offen-
sive cannot be criminalized when engaged in by consenting adults
in private. 285
At least one of these criminal statutes has withstood challenge
as a violation of the psychotherapist's right to privacy. 286 In the 1990
case of State v. Dutton, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota rejected
a therapist's claim that his right to engage in private and consensual
sexual activity was protected by the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 287 In upholding the criminal statute, the court
noted that the state can regulate private sexual conduct in certain
contexts, such as in cases of sodomy and prostitution. 288 The court
also noted that the line of Supreme Court cases protecting a right
to privacy does not protect a therapist from engaging in sexual
activity with a patient. 289 The court concluded that a sexual rela-
tionship between therapist and patient clearly violates the therapist's
duty to the patient and can be properly regulated by the police
power of the state. 29°
280 Id. at * 12.
291 See Letter from Harvey A. Schwartz for the Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts
to Senators Paul D. Harold and James T. Brett (May 30, 1990) (discussing the elimination
of consent as a defense in proposed in Massachusetts House Bill 5697) (on file with the
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW).
282 Id. The letter states: "The legislation equates every person who consults a health or
mental health professional—which by definition ranges from priests to podiatrists, from
psychiatrists to dentists—with a child, declaring that these patients are in all cases incapable
of saying no." Id.
283 Id.
288 Id.
283 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478, 480 (Mass. 1974)).
296 State v. Dutton, 450 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
282 Id. at 193-94.
268 Id. at 193.
289 Id. at 193-94.
29° Id.
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Absent these specialized criminal statutes, state courts may be
reluctant to uphold criminal prosecutions of psychotherapists who
engage in sexual misconduct. In the 1991 case of State v. Leiding,
the Court of Appeals of New Mexico held that a male psychologist
who had sexual contact with his male patient could not be prose-
cuted under a general criminal sexual penetration statute. 2" In
Leiding, the defendant psychologist was charged under a statute that
criminalized sexual penetration committed through the use of force
or coercion. 292 The court noted that force or coercion meant that
the perpetrator knew or had reason to know that the victim suffered
from a mental condition that rendered the victim incapable of
understanding the nature or consequence of the act. 293 The court
rejected the state's argument that the transference phenomenon
was the requisite "mental condition" required by the act. 294
 The
court noted that if the legislature wished to make therapist-patient
sex a crime, it should pass specific statutes as other states have. 295
In sum, in states without criminalization statutes for sexual
misconduct by therapists, egregious sexual misconduct by psycho-
therapists may be prosecuted as rape or sexual assault. 298 An emerg-
ing trend reveals states enacting statutes specifically criminalizing
most sexual contact between therapist and patient. 297 These statutes
are often broad, encompassing a wide range of situations that con-
stitute sexual misconduct. 298 In addition, these statutes almost al-
ways eliminate consent as a defense for the defendant therapist. 299
Although these statutes are relatively new, at least one has survived
a constitutional challenge. 5"
291 See State v. Leiding, 812 P.2d 797, 797 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
292 Id. at 798.
29' Id.
294
 Id. at 799.
295 See id. at 799, 800.
296 See, e.g., Bernstein v. Board of Medical Examiners, 22 Cal. Rptr. 419, 420 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1962); State v. Ely, 194 P. 988, 988 (Wash. 1921); Eberhart v. State, 34 N.E. 637, 637
(Ind. 1883).
297
 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 729 (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.5
(1986); 1990 F1.A. LAWS ch 70; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, .1 253 (West Supp. 1990);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §$ 609.344, 609.345 (West Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-06.1
(Supp. 1989); Wts. STAT. ANN. § 940.22 (West Supp. 1990).
29' See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-06.1 (Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. VI 940.22,
940.225(5) (West Supp. 1990).
299
 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 729 (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.5
(1986); 1990 FLA. LAws ch 70; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§. 609.344, 609.345 (West Supp. 1991);
N.D. CENT. Coax 12.1-20-06.1 (Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.22 (West Supp. 1990).
"° See, e.g., State v. Dutton, 450 N.W.2d 189, 193-94 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
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III. SUFFICIENCY OF LEGAL REMEDIES TO COMBAT SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT
The sexual exploitation of patients in psychotherapy is a serious
and complex problem. Some women who seek treatment are par-
ticularly vulnerable and easily exploited because of their past his-
tories of sexual abuse."' Many of them will experience transference,
projecting feelings onto the therapist from past unresolved rela-
tionships. Some of these women may even appear to be seductive.
In a healthy therapeutic relationship, the therapist would immedi-
ately recognize this behavior as transference and use it to help the
woman resolve the painful issues of her past."2 A manipulative or
exploitative therapist, however, takes advantage of this vulnerability,
with especially damaging results.
Therapists who engage in sexual contact with their patients
force these women to reenact the trauma, shame and secrecy of
childhood as, once again, they are victimized by a male authority
figure. These women are exploited and damaged in the same vul-
nerable area for which they initially sought help."3 Women who
are sexually exploited by their psychotherapists suffer tremendous
harm. They are left devastated, feeling vulnerable, depressed, and
at times, suicidal. Many find it extremely difficult, in spite of their
terrible pain, to seek additional therapy to cope with this emotional
trauma. They have lost their ability to place their trust in the hands
of a professional. Many need to be hospitalized. In addition, their
marriages or intimate relationships are torn apart, and they are left
feeling guilty and ashamed."4 In short, therapists who engage in
sexual relationships with their patients rarely leave them undam-
aged.
Currently, a victim of sexual misconduct can seek legal recourse
against her psychotherapist in any of three ways. First, an admin-
istrative remedy through a professional association or licensing
board is clearly limited." 5 Professional associations have jurisdiction
only over members and can do little to punish the therapist or
protect potential victims. Although a licensing board has the power
to revoke a therapist's license, the therapist may still be able to
practice professionally under a different title. Both administrative
See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
3°2 See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
3°3 See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698,701 (Minn. 1990).
"4 See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
3°3 See supra notes 80-107 and accompanying text.
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processes are time-consuming and complicated, providing no im-
mediate incentive for the patient. In addition, the board members
who serve on investigatory committees may be other psychothera-
peutic professionals and therefore biased. Ultimately, in pursuing
an administrative remedy, the sexually exploited patient invests
much time and energy without receiving much satisfaction.
One of the most commonly pursued remedies for sexual mis-
conduct is a malpractice claim against the therapist. The patient can
collect damages for actual hospitalization and psychiatric care, men-
tal and emotional suffering, and infliction of emotional distress.
Most courts hold that sexual contact between therapist and patient
is malpractice. 306 These courts usually base their findings of mal-
practice on the therapist's mishandling of the transference phenom-
enon. This process places a burden on the patient to show that the
sexual contact arose during the course of treatment. This require-
ment has not been difficult to meet because the sexual overtures
almost always begin during the therapeutic session, and even when
the actual contact occurs outside the office, courts have found the
therapist liable. 307
The advantages of a civil suit are numerous. First, the patient
is likely to be empowered by the process of forcing her abuser to
account publicly for his behavior, which is something she probably
was not able to do with a childhood abuser. In addition, bringing
the suit may allow the patient to resolve lingering feelings of guilt
and humiliation. Second, the course of the litigation is largely within
the patient's control, unlike a criminal prosecution where the state
is involved. Third, some therapists may be deterred from engaging
in sexual relationships by the threat of a civil suit, although the
manipulative therapist may believe he can control his client to keep
her from suing. The suit itself will force the therapist to account
for his transgressions by requiring him to pay large sums of money
as damages. He will also suffer a loss to his reputation and practice.
Finally, the patient is able to use the award to rebuild her life by
seeking new therapy to heal the profound damage she has suffered
at the hands of the exploitative therapist.
The final remedy available to redress sexual misconduct is crim-
inal prosecution under the recent criminalization statutes. 308 The
"6 Ste supra notes 131-63 and accompanying text.
"7
 Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 757-59, 761 (Mo. 1968); Olson v. Connerly, 445
N.W.2d 706, 708 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), aff 'd, 457 N.W.2d 479, 484 (Wis. 1990).
3" See supra notes 253-80 and accompanying text.
May 1992]
	
THERAPIST SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 	 681
existing criminalization statutes are similar in their broad definitions
of both the illegal sexual contact and the psychotherapists them-
selves. 309 Some statutes include not only psychiatrists and psychol-
ogists, but also social workers, marriage counselors and clergy. 310
Typically, therapists are criminally liable under these statutes for
sexual acts that occur during or outside of therapy, and in some
cases even after the therapeutic relationship has terminated. 3 " Be-
cause these criminal statutes are so broad, they cover a wide range
of sexual activity between therapists and patients that may result in
a variety of different circumstances.
Criminalization of sexual misconduct is a positive trend that
recognizes the seriousness of the problem of sexual misconduct by
psychotherapists. Such criminalization creates numerous benefits
both to victims of the sexual misconduct and to society in general.
First, criminal statutes may be useful in deterring certain therapists
from engaging in sexual misconduct. 312 Second, criminalization ben-
efits the victim by publicly punishing the therapist. Finally, crimin-
alization benefits society because therapists who are imprisoned as
a result of the criminal statutes are unable to harm additional pa-
tients.
One of the key goals of any criminal statute is to deter the
targeted behavior in the future. Unlike a civil lawsuit, therapists
may be deterred by the threat of criminal prosecution because a
third party, the state, initiates the suit rather than the patient. The
patient's spouse or subsequent therapist, or even a colleague of the
abusing therapist, may report the criminal violation to the public
prosecutor. Thus, the threat of criminal prosecution may be more
apt to deter a therapist because he may feel that he can exercise no
control over the decision of whether to prosecute. Moreover, the
threat of imprisonment, or a heavy fine, and a criminal record may
be a stronger deterrent than the monetary penalty imposed in a
civil suit in which the insurance company might pay the damages.
In addition to being an effective deterrent, criminalization of
sexual misconduct will directly benefit the victim. First, the victim
is able to witness the punishment of her abuser. For some victims,
the financial consequences of a civil trial are not sufficient to punish
"g See supra notes 262-67 and accompanying text.
31° See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 728(c)(1) (West 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.22(1)(1)
(West Supp. 1990).
3 " See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.344(1)(1), 609.345(1)(i) (West Supp. 1991).
312 Larry H. Strasburger et al., Criminalization of Psychotherapist-Patient Sex, 148 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 859, 860 (1991).
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the therapist. Under a criminal statute, the therapist faces possible
imprisonment or a heavy fine, either of which will result in a crim-
inal record. Criminal sanctions may satisfy the victim's need for
retribution. In addition, a victim of sexual misconduct often has
unresolved feelings of guilt because she convinced herself that she
was somehow at fault. By criminalizing the behavior, the state will
assure the victim that society condemns the actions of the therapist
and accepts the proposition that she was truly incapable of giving
consent.
Finally, criminalization will benefit society by enhancing public
safety. If the criminal prosecution results in imprisonment, the
therapist will no longer be able to harm innocent patients. A crim-
inal prosecution will also be likely to instigate license revocation
proceedings with a state licensing board. In addition, society will be
able to see a wrongdoer punished. Future "consumers," as well as
the general public, will begin to understand the severity of the
problem of sexual misconduct and learn to recognize the appro-
priate standards of psychotherapeutic care.
Despite the obvious benefits of criminalization, the statutes as
drafted do not adequately combat the problem of therapist-patient
sex. First, criminalization may inadvertently harm some victims by
invading their privacy or impacting negatively upon a civil suit,
including their ability to recover damages from the therapist's mal-
practice insurance policy which excludes coverage for criminal
acts. 513 Second, the lack of adequate classification in the criminali-
zation statutes between different types of sexual misconduct ignores
the complexity of the problem and the goal of deterrence." 4 Finally,
the criminal statutes do not make any attempt to rehabilitate the
therapists who are capable of change."5
Unlike a civil suit, a criminal prosecution is not initiated by the
patient. Some patients may prefer not to "go public" with their
3 ' 3 See id. at 860-61; Jorgenson et al., supra note 109, at 730.
3 ' 4 For example, some statutes do not differentiate between different types of therapist-
patient sexual relationships. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17—A, f 253 (West Supp. 1990);
N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-20-06.1 (Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. 940.22 (West Supp. 1990).
Other statutes impose different penalties, depending on the frequency or extent of sexual
contact. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 729(1),(2) (West 1990) (first violation is a misdemeanor,
second violation imposes mandatory imprisonment, a fine, or both); 1990 FLA. LAws ch.
70(1) (first violation is a third degree felony, second violation is a second degree felony);
Cow. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.5(1)(a), (2)(a) (1986) (sexual penetration or intrusion is class 4
felony, sexual assault is class 1 misdemeanor); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.344(1), 609.345(1)
(West Supp. 1991) (sexual penetration is third degree criminal assault, sexual contact is
fourth degree criminal sexual conduct).
"5 See Strasburger, supra note 312, at 861.
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experience by having to testify for the prosecution and to relive
their traumatic experience. Furthermore, the patient may perceive
the elimination of consent in these situations as the law treating her
as a child.This aspect of the criminal law may confuse the patient.
She may feel reassured by the fact that transference rendered her
incapable of consenting and therefore not to blame for the expe-
rience, yet may also feel demeaned by a law that deems her incap-
able of making a meaningful decision.
Even if the patient willingly participates in the criminal trial,
the trial may negatively impact the patient's civil lawsuit. Due to the
defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial, the criminal pros-
ecution will most likely take place prior to the civil trial. The patient,
after having relived the traumatic experience through her testimony
in the criminal trial, may be discouraged or unwilling to confront
the therapist again. Furthermore, an acquittal of the therapist in
the criminal trial may chill the patient's desire to pursue a civil
remedy.
Another possible negative effect of criminalization on the civil
case may be the patient's inability to collect damages from the
therapist's malpractice insurer, who will claim that the policy ex-
cludes criminal acts. 316 In the past, when sexual behavior between
the therapist and the patient was not criminalized by the states,
courts have rejected this argument, holding that policy exclusions
for criminal acts do not apply." Now, however, with these specific
criminal statutes, courts may deny coverage under the therapist's
professional liability policy when that policy expressly excludes
criminal acts. Even if the insurance policy does not contain such an
express exclusion, courts may be motivated to deny coverage based
on a public policy that dictates that an insured should not be in-
demnified for his criminal acts. 3 's
In such cases, the innocent victims of sexual misconduct may
suffer by not receiving payment of their damages by the defendant's
insurance company. If the therapist is unable to pay himself, the
patient might not receive monetary compensation at all. Without
this award, some patients may be delayed from entering further,
much needed therapy. Thus, the criminalization of sexual miscon-
duct could actually negatively impact patients.
313 See Strasburger, supra note 312, at 860-61; Jorgenson et al., supra note 109, at 730.
317 See supra notes 229-38 and accompanying text.
3113 See supra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
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Another drawback to the existing criminal statutes is the clas-
sification of types of sexual contacts between the therapist and
patient. Some attempt to draw artificial distinctions between types
of sexual contact, imposing greater penalties for "sexual penetra-
tion" than for "sexual contact."519 This attempt at categorization is
meaningless and ineffective in working towards accomplishing the
dual goals of deterring therapists from engaging in sexual miscon-
duct, and rehabilitating those who are susceptible to change. Both
of these goals are crucial in eliminating the problem of sexual
misconduct. These goals can best be understood by two examples
of different types of sexual involvement.
Consider first a therapist who carefully plans his sexual involve-
ment with his patient. 32° His actions are deliberate and manipula-
tive. He consciously deceives his patient by telling her that the sexual
activity is part of a "relaxation exercise" or "sexual counseling."
This therapist will likely engage in sexual relations with numerous
patients. In this scenario, the therapist takes advantage of the pa-
tient's vulnerability and trust that are part of the transference phe-
nomenon. He is clearly attempting to gratify his own needs, and
does not feel that he loved or cared for the patient. The patient in
this scenario obviously suffers much emotional or physical harm.
In a second scenario, consider the therapist who, while treating
a patient, begins to feel that he is "falling in love" with her."' He
has never before been romantically involved with a patient. As his
feelings become stronger during each session, he becomes confused.
He wrestles with his conscience, aware that such a relationship
presents ethical and legal problems, but he convinces himself that
this situation is different because he is experiencing "true love."
The patient returns his romantic feelings and a long-term sexual
relationship begins. This therapist has either not recognized the
patient's transference or has denied that he could fall prey to it,
and has failed to acknowledge his own counter-transference. Al-
though he did intend to engage in the sexual activity, he sincerely
319 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.5(1)(a), (2)(a) (1986) (sexual penetration or intrusion
is class 4 felony, sexual assault is class 1 misdemeanor); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(1),
609.345(1) (West Supp. 1991) (sexual penetration is third degree criminal assault, sexual
contact is fourth degree criminal sexual conduct).
520 See POPE & BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 2, at 6-8 (describing a scenario in which the
therapist claims he is engaging in sex therapy). Situations in which the therapist uses drugs
or physical force would also fall within this category of premeditated action. See id. at 12-
15.
'2 ' See id. at 15-16 (describing scenario in which therapist believes he is falling in love
with patient).
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believed that it would be beneficial to the patient. This irresponsible,
unprofessional and unethical decision can also result in much harm
to the patient.
In both scenarios the patient can emerge emotionally trauma-
tized. Although both therapists deserve some type of punishment,
the goals of criminalization involve more than just punishment; they
also include deterrence and rehabilitation. The therapist who be-
lieves he is falling in love will probably not be deterred by the threat
of criminal prosecution, because he is lost in a fantasy and not
thinking about the consequences of his actions. He may feel that
"love conquers all" and that he could never end up in jail for
pursuing such a relationship. In short, he merely rationalizes that
his situation is different and then he acts.
The therapist who plans his actions, however, may be more
likely to fear getting caught. He is aware that his actions are illicit.
Thus, he is able to reason through the consequences of his actions.
The existence of a statute that specifically prohibits this behavior,
eliminates consent as a defense, and threatens imprisonment, seri-
ous fines, public exposure and a permanent criminal record, is likely
to deter him from engaging in this behavior.
Criminal statutes will be ineffective in working towards a final
solution for this serious problem of sexual misconduct by psycho-
therapists if these statutes either continue to treat all types of sexual
misconduct alike, or draw artificial distinctions based on penetration
versus contact or frequency of incidents. The goal of the criminal
statutes should be to eliminate the problem. Therefore, state legis-
latures must approach this challenge with a broader, more enlight-
ened view than just seeking to punish. Instead, legislatures must
distinguish among the different scenarios of sexual misconduct in
more meaningful ways.
One possible solution is for a statute to take into account various
factual criteria, such as the role of transference, the number of
incidents, the degree of force or manipulation on the part of the
therapist, the duration of the relationship, the therapist's record of
similar violations in the past, the specific intent of the therapist, and
the likelihood of the therapist's successful rehabilitation. The statute
can further provide a range of different penalties, depending upon
the significance of the above factors. 322
"2 For example a state might use the following statute:
(a)	 Any psychotherapist, or any person holding himself or herself out to be
a psychotherapist, who engages in sexual contact with a patient or client is guilty
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This statutory scheme allows the criminal penalties to be ad-
justed to further the goals of deterrence and rehabilitation. For the
repeat offender or therapist who acted maliciously, a heavy fine or
jail sentence may act as a deterrent. This defendant is less likely to
be capable of rehabilitation and therefore would likely not benefit
from a corrective or educational program. If he is forced to serve
time in jail, he will be prevented from harming others in the future.
In contrast, a therapist who experiences a traditional counter-
transference situation would not likely be deterred by any criminal
penalty. For this therapist, rehabilitation is a more realistic goal. In
his case, probation coupled with a mandatory corrective program
will educate him about the harm he has caused and deter him from
future misconduct, should the state licensing board ever allow him
to practice again.
In conclusion, state legislatures considering whether to crimin-
alize therapist-patient sexual conduct need to understand the com-
plexity of the problem and the diverse circumstances in which it
may arise. Statutes should differentiate types of therapist-patient
relationships and should further not only the goal of punishment
but also the goals of deterrence and rehabilitation. These latter
goals require that state legislatures draft criminal statutes to draw
meaningful distinctions between different types of-relationships and
that courts apply the criminal penalties accordingly. The manipu-
lative therapist, incapable of rehabilitation, should be subject to
imprisonment or a serious fine. The confused or "in love" therapist
should be required to undergo a mandatory treatment program.
A final way to address the problem of therapist-patient sex is
through education and professional training. In many cases, ther-
apists themselves fail to recognize transference and counter-trans-
of sexual exploitation. Consent of the patient or client is not a defense to this
action but may be relevant to sentencing as defined in (b).
(b)	 The first violation of (a) shall be punishable by a mandatory rehabilitation
program. The court, at its discretion, may also impose a fine not exceeding $_
or order imprisonment of not more than _ years, or both, based on one or
more of the following factors:
(1) the defendant used physical force to engage in sexual contact;
(2) the defendant used drugs or other mind altering substances or
techniques to engage in sexual contact;
(3) the defendant used deceit, fraud, or trickery to engage in sexual
contact;
(4) the patient or client knowingly consented to sexual contact
(c)	 Second and subsequent violations of (a) shall be punishable by a fine not
exceeding $._ or imprisonment of not more than — years, or both.
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ference as they occur. If these therapists do ask for help from their
colleagues, the issues are likely to be minimized or "swept under
the rug."323 Professional training programs are reluctant to address
sexual exploitation. 324 The psychotherapeutic professional com-
munity should require preventative training and education pro-
grams as part of licensing or certification and continuing education
requirements. This training should include exposure to the testi-
mony of patients who have been damaged by sexual contact with
therapists and open discussions of counter-transference. 325 This in-
teractive type of program would influence the therapist much more
than a passing reference in a training course or a single line in an
ethics handbook.
In addition, professional associations and state consumer or-
ganizations should place a heavier emphasis on consumer educa-
tion.s26 Patients could be educated through the use of literature
dispensed by the therapist or placed in office waiting rooms.' 27 Such
widespread acknowledgment and discussion of the problem will not
only educate potential victims, but will serve as an ongoing reminder
to therapists as well. Preventative and educational programs for all
involved should effectively supplement the legal advances in com-
batting this serious problem.
IV. CONCLUSION
In recent years, the number of patients sexually abused by
mental health professionals has grown rapidly. The close emotional
bond that forms during therapy may precipitate sexual exploitation
by these professionals. Patients may emerge from these relation-
ships emotionally harmed. They are left feeling shocked, humiliated
and depressed, and in some cases, even suicidal.
One option available to victims is administrative remedies,
which are time-consuming and often ineffective. Alternatively,
courts commonly recognize civil causes of action for psychotherapist
sexual misconduct and provide victims with financial compensation
for their suffering. Finally, criminalization poses some benefits to
5" Id. at 39.
3" Id, The problem of therapist-patient sex has been "treated with benign and sometimes
malicious neglect" and there have been few suggestions for either remedying or preventing
the problem. Id. at 150.
"5 Id. at 151.
326 See id. at 154-55.
527 Id. at 154.
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victims. The existing criminal statutes, however, are too broad to
achieve the goal of eliminating the problem of sexual misconduct
by psychotherapists. The statutes should differentiate between types
of sexual misconduct and adjust their penalties accordingly. Ther-
apists who are capable of rehabilitation should be required to
undergo treatment, while others should be punished with impris-
onment or fines. If these statutes are drafted with an eye towards
the complexity of the problem, they may be more successful in
eliminating the problem of sexual misconduct by psychotherapists.
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